

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Original/Appellate/Advisory Jurisdiction)

Present:

JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE ALI BAQAR NAJAFI

F.C.P.L.A.172-L/2026

*[against the order dated 18.03.2026
passed by the Lahore High Court,
Lahore in W.P. No.17232/2026]*

*Javed Iqbal Rana (deceased) through his
legal heirs*

...Petitioner(s)

Versus

*Abdul Waheed Rana (deceased) through
his legal heirs and others*

...Respondent(s)

For the Petitioner(s) : Mian Muhammad Tahir, ASC

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Muzzafar Hussain, ASC

Research Assistance By : Dr. Muhammad Mumtaz,
Research Officer

Date of Hearing : 19.08.2026

JUDGMENT

AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, CJ.- This petition filed under Article 175(F)(1)(C) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenging the order dated 18.03.2026 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 17232/2026, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner(s) was dismissed.

2. The lis in the present petition concerns succession to property bearing No.15-L, Model Town Extension, Lahore, owned by Ijaz Ahmed Rana, who died issueless on 31.12.2018. The petitioners claim themselves to be the sons of a predeceased brother of the deceased and, on that basis, assert a right of inheritance under Muhammadan Law. Their grievance is that, although they were initially impleaded as defendants in the suit for declaration, their names were subsequently deleted from the array of parties through an amended plaint, allegedly without their knowledge, whereafter the suit culminated in an ex-parte decree in

favour of the respondents. The petitioners claim to have acquired knowledge of the said decree upon issuance of an NOC by the LDA in favour of the respondents and consequently moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC, for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The application was dismissed by the learned trial Court and the order was maintained by the learned Additional District Judge as well as by the Lahore High Court. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned Order dated 18.03.2026 was passed in disregard of the applicable Muslim Law of Inheritance and without affording the petitioners, an opportunity of hearing or to lead evidence who were originally impleaded as plaintiffs No.5-A to 5-E. He submitted that their exclusion from the array of legal heirs was founded upon misreading of the record and misapplication of the judgments reported as 2016 MLD 266, 2007 MLD 800 and 2007 MLD 33. He further contended that the Courts below acted with material irregularity and undue haste, thereby causing serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and examined the contention advanced before us in the light of the admitted relationship between the parties and the statutory scheme governing succession. The relationship of the petitioners with the deceased, Javed Iqbal Rana, is not in dispute. It is equally an admitted position that Ijaz Ahmed Rana son of Rana Manzoor Hussain died issueless and that the petitioners are the children of his predeceased brother. Likewise, the status of respondents Nos.1 to 5 as the legal heirs of the deceased and their entitlement as sharers and residuary heirs is not disputed. The controversy, therefore, lies within a narrow compass, namely, whether, by virtue of their relationship with the deceased, the petitioners can invoke Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ("the Ordinance") so as to claim a right of inheritance in his estate. The answer to this question must necessarily be found in the plain language of the provision and the legislative scheme embodied therein.

“4. **Succession.** [(1)] In the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propositus before the opening of succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens, shall per stripes receive a share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter, as the case may be, would have received if alive.

[(2)] If a Muslim male from Ahl-e-Teshih dies, the share of a widow in the immovable property left behind by her deceased husband shall be as follows:—

- (a) one-fourth share of the fixed price or value of the property, if there is no child left behind the deceased husband; and
- (b) one-eighth share, if there is child left behind.

(3) If there are two or more widows, the share, as mentioned in sub-section (2), shall be divided equally among them.

(4) The price or value of the property shall be the price or value existing at the time of payment and not the price or value which existed at the time of death of the husband: Provided that if the legal heirs of the deceased do not give the widow her share in the above terms, she shall become entitled to her due share in the corpus of immovable property.

(5) A widow is entitled to her share in the corpus of movable property of her deceased husband provided that the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) shall mutatis mutandis apply.

(6) Fiqah-e-Jafri recognizes right of a husband to get his share from the property left by his deceased wife, either movable or immovable, as follows: [(a)] one-half share, if there is no child left behind; and [(b)] one-fourth share of the property, if there is child left behind.

(7) In case of dispute, the parties or any of the parties may have recourse to a court of competent jurisdiction or by approaching the Mujtahid-e-Alam from the panel maintained by the Council of Islamic Ideology. The decision of Mujtahid-e-Alam shall have a status of an award and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940). Explanation.—

The expression “Mujtahid-e-Alam (Faqih-e-Azam)” means a juris-consult, religious scholar or doctor of Shia school of thought well versed with Shariah having international repute and of such recognition. The Council of Islamic Ideology shall maintain a panel of Mujtahide-Alam having aforesaid qualifications.

(8) As enshrined in Article 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the inheritance rights of Ahl-e-Tashih and matters connected

therewith or ancillary thereto shall be decided according to their personal law interpreted by Fiqah-e-Jafria (Shia school of thought).”

Section 4 of the Ordinance provides that where a son or daughter of the propositus dies before the opening of succession, the children of such son or daughter, if alive at the time succession opens, shall receive *per stirpes* the share which their deceased parent would have received had he or she been alive. The provision is thus carefully structured around two identifiable relationships: first, the predeceased person must be a son or daughter of the propositus; and secondly, the persons claiming through such predeceased person must be his or her children. The expression “propositus” is of considerable significance. It denotes the person whose estate has opened for succession. In the present case, the propositus is Javed Iqbal Rana. His predeceased brother, therefore, was neither his son nor his daughter. The petitioners, correspondingly, are neither the children of a predeceased son nor of a predeceased daughter of the propositus; rather, they are the children of his predeceased brother. Conversely, respondents Nos.1 to 5 fall within the categories of sharers and residuaries in respect of the estate of Ijaz Ahmed Rana (deceased). The foundational condition upon which Section 4 of the Ordinance operates is, therefore, conspicuously absent. The provision cannot be extended, by implication or analogy, to a class of heirs which the legislature has neither expressly included nor intended to bring within its ambit.

5. The law of inheritance (*Mirath* or *Faraid*) constitutes one of the most precisely codified branches of classical Islamic jurisprudence. The primary sources are the Holy Quran — principally Surah Al-Nisa (IV:11-12, 176) — the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), and the consensus of the Companions (*Ijma*). The Hanafi school, which is the dominant school in Pakistan, developed an elaborate hierarchical system for the distribution of a deceased's estate. The Qur’anic scheme itself identifies the principal shares of heirs in specific terms. The Qur’an¹ provides detailed rules of succession. The Qur’anic injunctions concerning

¹ (Surah al-Nisa, particularly verses 4:7, 4:11, 4:12 and 4:176)

parents, children, spouses and siblings are not expressed in terms of an unrestricted principle whereby descendants of every predeceased heir succeed in the latter's place. The classical jurisprudential rules consequently developed the distinction between *ashab al-furud* (sharers), *'asabah* (residuaries) and, where applicable, *dhawu al-arham* (distant kindred). The Holy Prophet (PBUH) is reported to have said:

"Deliver the shares to those entitled to them, and what remains goes to the nearest male agnate²

This hadith encapsulates the fundamental structure of Islamic inheritance law: first satisfy the sharers, then give the residue to the nearest male agnate (*Asabah*), and only in the complete absence of both categories do distant kindred take.

6. Distant kindred (*Dhawil Arham*) comprise all blood relatives who are neither sharers nor residuaries.⁽ Al-Quduri (d. 1037 CE), *Mukhtasar Al-Quduri* (classical Hanafi text), section on *Dhawil Arham*. See also Mulla, *Principles of Mahomedan Law* (19th ed.), Section 79) They inherit only upon the complete absence of both sharers and residuaries. The Hanafi school further subdivides them into four classes for purposes of internal prioritization, but none of them can compete with any sharer or residuary.

7. The children of a predeceased brother fall squarely within *Dhawil Arham* (ذوي الأرحام). A brother's son (nephew) is a residuary; but a brother's grandson — and by analogy, a predeceased brother's children who are themselves below the primary category — depend on precise genealogical analysis. However, the critical point for present purposes is that no collateral descendant can claim under the principle of *Tanzil* (substitution/representation) in classical Hanafi law.³

8. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the legislature has employed precise and restrictive language, the Court cannot enlarge the statutory field by adding words which the

² . "Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith No. 6732 (Kitab al-Faraid); Sahih Muslim, Hadith No. 1615."

³ (Fyzee, *op. cit.*, p. 447: 'The doctrine of representation, by which the issue of a deceased person represent him and take his share, is entirely foreign to Muhammadan law.' This is a foundational principle of Islamic succession}.

legislature consciously omitted. Section 4 does not employ the expression “predeceased legal heir”, “predeceased relative”, “predeceased brother or sister”, or any other expression of comparable amplitude. It specifically identifies the category of predeceased relatives as sons and daughters and the persons benefiting from the provision as children of such sons and daughters. The deliberate choice of these expressions cannot be treated as accidental or insignificant.

9. This distinction assumes greater significance because Section 4 constitutes a statutory departure from the ordinary rules of Muslim intestate succession. The provision does not establish a general principle that whenever an heir dies before the propositus, his or her descendants automatically step into the shoes of the deceased heir. Rather, it creates a particular statutory arrangement in respect of one expressly identified class of descendants. Consequently, the provision has to be applied according to its text and cannot, by analogy, be extended to a relationship which the legislature has not included. Section 4 applies to the relations specifically mentioned therein and cannot, by analogy, be extended to another category of legal heirs. Muslim inheritance is governed by defined rules and that a person whose position under those rules is that of a particular category of heir cannot alter that legal status by invoking Section 4 through analogy.

10. There is also a fundamental distinction between statutory succession under Section 4 and classical Muslim law of inheritance. Under the traditional Sunni law of inheritance, the estate of a Muslim devolves upon those heirs who are alive at the moment succession opens, according to their respective categories and rules of exclusion. A predeceased brother does not transmit a prospective inheritance in the estate of his brother to his children merely because he would have been related to the propositus had he survived him. The children of such collateral relative cannot, therefore, claim to inherit by simply stepping into the position of their deceased father unless a positive rule of law creates such representation. In the classical Hanafi scheme, the son of a full

brother is recognized in the category of residuaries in appropriate circumstances, whereas descendants of certain female collateral relatives fall within the category of distant kindred. Their entitlement, however, depends upon the existence or absence of nearer sharers and residuaries and cannot be created merely by analogy with Section 4. This is precisely why the judicial precedents have consistently cautioned against transforming the limited statutory rule of representation into a general principle of Muslim succession.

11. The distinction between the petitioners' position and that contemplated by Section 4 is therefore not merely technical. In the case contemplated by Section 4, the propositus had a son or daughter who predeceased him or her, and the legislature expressly allowed the children of that son or daughter to represent the deceased parent and receive *per stirpes* the share that would have fallen to that parent. In the present case, however, the person through whom the petitioners claim was a brother of the propositus. The petitioners thus stand in a collateral, rather than lineal, relationship to the propositus. Section 4 contains no provision authorizing such collateral representation.

12. The expression *per stirpes* employed in Section 4 also reinforces this conclusion. It does not establish an independent and universally applicable rule of representation; rather, it prescribes the mode in which the statutory share is to be distributed among the children of the specifically identified predeceased son or daughter. The existence of a statutory mechanism for calculating the share cannot be divorced from the class of persons for whom that mechanism was created.

13. It is, therefore, impermissible to reason that because the legislature has recognized representation in one situation, the same principle must necessarily apply to every other relationship. Such reasoning would amount to supplying an omission in the statute. In matters of succession, particularly where the legislature has expressly altered the ordinary rules of inheritance, the Court must be slow to enlarge the statutory exception by analogy. The argument that the petitioners should be treated as representatives

of their predeceased father, therefore, cannot succeed. Their father, being the brother of the deceased, was not a person falling within the expression “son or daughter of the propositus” appearing in Section 4. Consequently, the petitioners, being children of a predeceased brother, do not fall within the class of persons upon whom the statutory benefit of Section 4 has been conferred.

14. The proposition is further fortified by the settled rule that succession opens only upon the death of the propositus. It is the status of the persons entitled to inherit at that moment, subject to the applicable statutory modifications, which determines the devolution of the estate. The petitioners cannot claim that their deceased father had acquired an inheritable share in the estate of Javed Iqbal Rana which subsequently descended upon them, because their father had himself predeceased the propositus and, therefore, no succession to the estate of the latter had opened in his favour. The statutory exception contained in Section 4 does not alter that position in the case of a predeceased brother.

15. It is also material that the deceased is admittedly issueless. Such fact, by itself, does not enlarge the scope of Section 4. The absence of direct descendants may affect the application of the ordinary rules of succession and may bring other categories of heirs into consideration, but it does not authorize the Court to introduce into Section 4 a category which its language does not contain. The question whether the petitioners inherit under the general rules of Muslim law must, therefore, be determined independently of Section 4 and according to the precise status assigned to them under the applicable school of Muslim jurisprudence. Thus, even assuming that the relationship of the petitioners with the deceased is admitted and that their father was the deceased's real brother, such relationship by itself does not attract Section 4. The statute does not proceed upon the broad concept of blood relationship; it proceeds upon a specifically defined genealogical relationship. The distinction between a predeceased son/daughter and a predeceased brother/sister is therefore substantive and decisive. The Court is mindful that the result may, in a given factual setting, appear harsh to descendants

of a predeceased collateral relative. Nevertheless, succession is a matter governed by law, and neither sentiment nor perceived hardship can furnish a basis for creating an heir where the governing law does not recognize one.

16. We, therefore, hold that Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is attracted only where the predeceased heir is a son or daughter of the propositus and the claim is made by the children of such son or daughter. The provision does not extend, either expressly or by analogy, to the children of a predeceased brother of the propositus. The petitioners, being children of the predeceased brother of Javed Iqbal Rana, consequently cannot derive a right of inheritance from Section 4.

17. As regards the other appendage of the submission, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that, the parties as well as the deceased admittedly being governed by the Hanafi school of Muslim law, the petitioners, being children of the pre-deceased brother of the deceased, are equally entitled to succeed to the estate and cannot be excluded from inheritance merely on the basis of their classification. The submission, however, does not withstand the settled principles governing succession under Hanafi law.

18. It is a well-established principle of Hanafi law that, for purposes of succession, heirs are divided into three classes, namely, (i) sharers (*Ashab-ul-Faraiz*), (ii) residuary (*Asabat*), and (iii) distant kindred (*Zawil-ul-Arham*). Sharers are those upon whom the law confers specified shares; residuary take the residue remaining after satisfaction of the claims of the sharers; whereas distant kindred comprise those blood relations who fall in neither of the first two categories. The classification is substantive and determines the order in which the estate devolves; the three classes do not stand on an equal footing so as to confer a concurrent right of inheritance. According to Syed Ameer Ali in his book on Mahomedan Law under the Hanfi Law of Succession⁴ the heirs connected to the deceased by the tie of blood are divided into

⁴ (Syed Ameer Ali, *Mahommedan Law*, Vol. I, Lahore: Law Publishing Company, 1976, p. 15.)

three classes, namely, sharers, I agnates and uterine relations. The agnates are called residuaries and the uterine relations are called the distant kindred. According to the learned author and this is well-established the sharers take their specified portions and the residue is then divided among the agnates. If there should be no agnates but only uterine relations, the residue would revert or return to the sharers in proportion to their shares except in the case of the husband or wife. It is only when there are neither "sharers" nor "agnates" that the estate is divided among the uterine relations. From these established rules governing the succession under the Hanfi Law, it is clear that in the presence of an heir belonging to the category of "residuaries" no one falling in the class known as distant kindred can inherit the property of the deceased. The Supreme Court in Muhammad Kasim case⁵ has expressly recognized this scheme and held that, where an heir belonging to the class of residuary is present, a person falling within the category of distant kindred cannot inherit.

19. The order of succession is equally well settled. After satisfaction of funeral expenses, debts and valid legacies, the prescribed shares are first allotted to the sharers. The residue, if any, thereafter devolves upon the residuaries. It is only in the absence of both sharers and residuaries that the estate passes to the distant kindred. Thus, the right of distant kindred is not an independent or co-extensive right with that of sharers and residuaries; rather, it is a subsidiary right which arises only upon the non-availability of heirs belonging to the preceding classes.

20. This principle is founded upon the very scheme of *faraid*. The Qur'anic injunctions prescribe definite portions for the recognized sharers, while the residue is dealt with under the established rules of *asabat*. The law therefore does not proceed merely upon the numerical or genealogical proximity of blood relations. What is material is the juridical character of the relationship and the category of heir into which the claimant falls. Consequently, a person cannot claim precedence over a sharer or a residuary merely because he is also related by blood to the

⁵ (*Muhammad Kasim v. Khair Muhammad and others* (1987 SCMR 1560))

deceased. The principle of *qarabat* operates within, and not independently of, the established classes and rules of exclusion governing Muslim succession.

21. In the present case, the relationship of the petitioners with the deceased is not in dispute. They are admittedly the children of his pre-deceased brother. The question, therefore, is not whether they are related to the deceased, but whether such relationship places them in a class capable of succeeding in the presence of the heirs who admittedly survived the deceased. Their claim cannot be sustained by treating them as sharers, for no prescribed share is assigned to them by reason of the relationship asserted. Nor can they be elevated to the status of residuaries merely by placing reliance upon the fact that their father was the brother of the deceased. A pre-deceased brother does not survive to inherit, and the children of such brother do not, under the general Hanafi law, acquire his supposed share by a doctrine of representation. The distinction becomes particularly important in view of section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. That provision constitutes a specific statutory departure from the ordinary rule of succession in respect of the children of a pre-deceased son or daughter of the *propositus*. It cannot be enlarged by analogy so as to extend the same benefit to the children of a pre-deceased brother.

22. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, the petitioners' claim is plainly untenable. The respondents (1-5), as found by the Courts below and not shown to have been wrongly classified, include heirs falling within the superior categories of succession, namely, sharers and residuary. Their presence consequently prevents the estate from devolving upon persons falling within the third class. The petitioners, being children of a pre-deceased brother and hence falling within the category of distant kindred, cannot participate in the inheritance so long as heirs belonging to the preceding classes are available. The argument that all parties being Hanafi Muslims must necessarily inherit *pari passu* is, therefore, misconceived. The common applicability of Hanafi law does not place all blood relations upon

an equal footing; rather, it subjects each claimant to the hierarchy prescribed by that law. Parity of personal law is not parity of entitlement. The right of inheritance must be determined according to the legal classification of the heir and the rules of exclusion applicable thereto. It is thus not the absence of relationship between the petitioners and the deceased which defeats their claim. Their claim fails because, notwithstanding that relationship, the law places them in a category which is postponed to, and excluded by, the presence of entitled respondents (1-5) as sharers and residuaries. Once such superior heirs are available, no estate remains open to succession by distant kindred. The Courts below, therefore, committed no error in declining to recognize any inheritable share in favour of the petitioners.

23. Adverting to the question of limitation, it is an admitted position on the record that the petitioners themselves were plaintiffs in the proceedings before the learned Trial Court and that the judgment was pronounced on 05.05.2023 in the presence of their learned counsel. Notwithstanding such knowledge, the petitioners did not assail the said judgment within the period prescribed by law and instead chose to move the application in the year 2025, after an inordinate lapse of time. The application, therefore, was *ex facie* barred by limitation.

24. The attempt of the petitioners to overcome this obvious bar by asserting that they had neither executed nor signed the plaint is of no assistance to them. The said assertion, even if taken at its face value, does not explain their subsequent conduct. Significantly, the petitioners have not disputed the engagement or authority of the learned counsel who represented them in the proceedings and continued to appear on their behalf until the judgment was pronounced. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court through a duly engaged counsel, participated in the proceedings through such representation and allowed the matter to culminate in a judgment rendered in the presence of their counsel, the petitioners cannot, after the lapse of considerable time, disown the proceedings merely by alleging that they had not personally executed the plaint.

25. The principle underlying the law of limitation is founded upon the need for finality in litigation. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 makes the dismissal of a suit, appeal or application instituted after expiry of the prescribed period a statutory obligation of the Court, subject to the exceptions recognized by law. The law does not permit a litigant to keep a concluded proceeding in a state of perpetual uncertainty by electing, at his convenience, the time at which he would challenge an adjudication of which he had knowledge. We have no hesitation to hold that limitation requires a litigant to pursue his legal remedy with due diligence and without dilatoriness or negligence; it is not a mere technical rule but a substantive part of the law intended, inter alia, to secure finality to judicial proceedings.

26. In the present case, no plausible explanation has been furnished for the petitioner's failure to challenge the judgment dated 05.05.2023 within the prescribed period. More importantly, no circumstance has been shown which could constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the delay within the contemplation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The statutory burden is upon the person seeking extension of time to satisfactorily account for the entire period of delay; mere assertions of want of knowledge, unsupported by the record, cannot displace the legal consequence flowing from their representation throughout the proceedings. Section 5 itself requires the appellant or applicant to satisfy the Court that sufficient cause existed for not pursuing the remedy within the prescribed period.

27. The plea regarding non-execution of the plaint, therefore, does not advance the petitioners' case. A party who has consciously invoked the jurisdiction of a Court and has remained represented through counsel cannot, after the proceedings have culminated against him, evade the consequences of the adjudication by merely disputing the formal execution of the initial pleading, particularly when the representation through counsel throughout the material proceedings is not denied. The petitioner's conduct, viewed in its entirety, demonstrates knowledge of and

participation in the proceedings rather than ignorance of the adjudication sought to be questioned.

28. There is, however, another and equally significant aspect of the matter. The objection as to limitation does not arise in isolation from the substantive controversy. The learned Trial Court, upon examination of the relationship of the parties with the deceased and the applicable principles of Muslim personal law, had already concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to inherit from the estate of the deceased. That finding, as discussed hereinbefore, suffers from no misapplication of law or misreading of the material available on record. Consequently, even if the question of limitation were examined independently, it would not furnish any basis for unsettling a judgment which is otherwise found to be legally sustainable on the merits.

29. The two considerations operate cumulatively. First, the petitioners, being parties to the original proceedings and having remained represented through counsel when the judgment was pronounced, were not entitled to resurrect the concluded litigation through an application brought after an unexplained and substantial delay. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the very right which they sought to assert had been found by the learned Trial Court, upon application of the governing law of succession, not to accrue in their favour. A procedural challenge cannot be employed to confer a substantive right which the applicable law does not recognize. It is, therefore, not a case where the bar of limitation alone has been permitted to defeat an otherwise established substantive right. Rather, the petitioners fail on both procedural and substantive grounds: their challenge was brought beyond the prescribed period without sufficient explanation, and, in any event, the learned Trial Court had correctly declined to recognize in them any inheritable interest in the estate of the deceased. No jurisdictional defect, illegality, misreading or non-reading of material evidence has been demonstrated which could warrant interference with such finding.

30. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment dated 05.05.2023, whereby the learned Courts below concurrently concluded the

matter against the petitioners, has not been shown to suffer from any error of law, misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or jurisdictional infirmity. The subsequent order dated 18.03.2026 passed by the learned High Court, whereby the petitioners' belated challenge was declined, likewise does not disclose any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. No miscarriage of justice or exceptional circumstance has been demonstrated which could justify reopening the matter after such an inordinate lapse of time.

31. The belated invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay and without demonstrating any substantive defect in the judgment dated 05.05.2023 or the order dated 18.03.2026, cannot furnish a lawful basis for unsettling proceedings which had otherwise attained finality.

32. In these circumstances, no case is made out for grant of leave. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed and leave is refused, with costs.

CHIEF JUSTICE

JUDGE

Lahore,
19.08.2026
APPROVED FOR REPORTING
RajaAhsan/-