Appeal Limitation During Court Holidays: Supreme Court Requires Filing on Reopening Day

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

Holiday protection ended on the first reopening day

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that when the appeal limitation period expires during court holidays, the benefit of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is available for filing on the first day the Court reopens. In the two cases before it, appeals filed one and two days after reopening could not receive that protection, and no reasonable explanation had been furnished for condonation of the delay. Judgment, paragraph 6.

Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi wrote the common judgment dated 3 July 2026, sitting with Chief Justice Yahya Afridi. It decided Civil Appeal Nos. 348 and 349 of 2018, with CMA Nos. 797 and 798 of 2025 listed in the common heading. The appellants were Muhammad Akram and others in one appeal and Nazir Hussain and others in the other; the respondents were Mst. Nazeer Begum, deceased through her legal representatives, and others. The supplied copy is approved for reporting but does not print a reporter citation. Complete judgment.

The Court set aside the Lahore High Court's judgments only to the extent of limitation and restored the Additional District Judge, Multan's orders dated 15 and 16 December 2000 for the reasons given in its judgment. The civil appeals were allowed in those terms. Judgment, paragraph 7.

The land dispute behind the limitation question

A judgment and decree had been passed in favour of the present respondents on 7 November 1979. In execution, the land was transferred through a registered document under court orders. The present appellants objected, claiming to be bona fide purchasers, and their objection petitions were allowed on 3 July 1995. The judgment records that claim; it does not finally adjudicate the entire ownership dispute in this limitation ruling. Judgment, paragraph 4.

The respondents applied for a certified copy of the order on 5 July 1995 and received it on 4 September 1995. The civil courts were closed for holidays from 1 August to 9 September 1995. They filed the two appeals on 12 and 13 September 1995. Judgment, paragraph 4.

The matter eventually reached the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision Nos. 481-D and 482-D of 2001. Its judgments of 27 October 2015 were challenged before the Supreme Court, which granted leave on 8 March 2018. The common issue was how limitation affected the appeals against the order of 3 July 1995. Judgment, paragraphs 1–3.

Why 11 September 1995 was decisive

The Supreme Court treated the following dates as material:

• The court vacation ran from 1 August to 9 September 1995.
• The following day, 10 September, was a Sunday and therefore also a holiday.
• The first reopening day was Monday, 11 September 1995.
• The appeals were filed on 12 and 13 September, after that first reopening day.

The Court recorded that the applicable thirty-day period had expired during the vacation and that the certified copies had already been obtained. On that footing, the litigants had to file on 11 September to obtain the benefit of the court-closure provision. Judgment, paragraph 6.

Section 4 does not supply a fresh full appeal period after the vacation. It allows filing on reopening when the prescribed period ends while the Court is closed. Here, the Court held that the protection ceased at the end of the first reopening day. Judgment, paragraphs 5–6; Limitation Act research text, section 4.

The section 4 rule is not a general ban on condonation

The judgment also examined whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late filings. It found none before either the appellate court or the High Court. The result therefore involved both the loss of section 4's reopening-day protection and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for delay. Judgment, paragraph 6.

It would be too broad to say that filing after reopening can never be considered under any other applicable provision. Section 5 of the Act permits extension in specified proceedings on sufficient cause; its application depends on the proceeding and governing law. The present ruling found no reasonable explanation on this record. Limitation Act research text, section 5; judgment, paragraph 6.

The Court did not decide the certified-copy timing controversy

The leave-granting order had identified a separate argument: whether the relevant certified-copy time should be calculated by reference to preparation rather than actual collection, and whether the intervening delay was explained. It mentioned earlier authorities relied on by counsel for that contention. Judgment, paragraph 2.

The final judgment expressly declined to comment on the certified-copy exclusion question under section 12(5). Instead, it decided the appeals through the court-closure rule because, on the facts it accepted, the appeal period had expired during vacation and the copies were already available before reopening. Judgment, paragraph 6.

The High Court had concentrated on certified-copy exclusion. The Supreme Court held that this did not answer the decisive failure to file on the reopening day. The present decision should therefore not be reported as a fresh ruling that actual collection can never affect every certified-copy calculation. It left the particular exclusion issue identified in the leave order unresolved. Judgment, paragraphs 2 and 6.

Sections and Schedule articles should be distinguished

The supplied judgment repeatedly refers to provisions 4 and 12(5) as “Articles”. In the Act's structure, they are section 4 and section 12(5); Article 152 is a First Schedule entry. This report uses that distinction while preserving the original PDF. Limitation Act research text; judgment, paragraphs 4–6.

Article 152 provides thirty days for the specified CPC appeal to a District Judge, running from the decree or order appealed from. It is not a universal thirty-day period for every kind of appeal. Section 12 addresses exclusions, including the copy-application interval described in subsection (5). The Court's operative reasoning here rests on section 4. Limitation Act research text, sections 4 and 12 and Article 152; judgment, paragraphs 4–6.

The linked statutory download is the site's supplied research copy; it does not establish a fully current consolidated amendment cut-off. The Pakistan Code's official listing provides a separate official route to the Act.

What the earlier authorities contributed

The leave order referred to West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi, 1973 SCMR 555; Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh, 1975 SCMR 157; and Mian Muhammad Sabir v. Malik Muhammad Sadqi through legal heirs and others, PLD 2008 SC 577. They appear as authorities supporting counsel's certified-copy contention, rather than as a final determination of that issue in this appeal. Judgment, paragraph 2.

The Court also considered Province of Punjab through Collector Gujrat v. Muhammad Saleem and others, PLD 2014 SC 783, also cited as 2015 PSC 561. It held that the High Court had misapplied that authority. The passage reproduced concerns an urgent filing during vacation being treated as filed on reopening, with section 4's benefit. That situation did not excuse the unexplained filings after reopening in the present cases. These earlier references are reported as cited in the supplied judgment; their separate full texts have not been independently verified. Judgment, paragraph 6.

Result and practical lesson

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, set aside the two High Court judgments to the extent of limitation, and restored the Additional District Judge's orders. It did not use this judgment to finally determine all questions about the land or the asserted bona fide purchases. Judgment, paragraphs 4 and 7.

For filing practice, the decision requires careful separation of the applicable Schedule period, any lawful exclusion, the court's actual closure dates, and its first reopening day. Where section 4 is needed, the reopening day must be treated as the filing deadline. If that day is missed, the record must support whatever further relief from delay the applicable law permits; the vacation alone did not explain the delay here. Judgment, paragraphs 4–6.

Sources

• Complete supplied Supreme Court judgment — Civil Appeal Nos. 348 and 349 of 2018, decided 3 July 2026. The six-page PDF includes a final page containing its case-number header.
• Limitation Act, 1908 — site's supplied research copy and statutory navigation.
• Pakistan Code — official Limitation Act listing.
• Earlier authorities are identified above as cited in the supplied judgment. Separate texts, a matching direct official judgment download, a subsequently assigned reporter citation and later judicial treatment have not been independently verified.