Chance Witnesses and Medical Evidence in Murder Trials: Supreme Court Explains Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

What the Supreme Court held

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that evidence from a chance witness cannot ordinarily receive implicit reliance unless the witness satisfactorily explains why he was present at a place where his residence, work, occupation or daily routine would not normally take him.

The Court also clarified that medical evidence is generally confirmatory. It may establish the injuries, weapon type, cause of death and homicidal nature of an occurrence, but it cannot independently identify an assailant or prove the specific role of an accused when the ocular account is unreliable.

In Mujahid alias Mujahidi and another v The State, Criminal Petitions No. 356-L and 417-L of 2016, the Court found that the two alleged eyewitnesses were chance witnesses whose stated reason for being at the scene lacked independent support. Their unusually precise account of firing by five armed men, limited recovery of crime empties and the failure to send recovered weapons for forensic comparison created further doubt.

The convictions and sentences of Mujahid alias Mujahidi and Nadeem alias Deemi were set aside. Both were acquitted by benefit of doubt and ordered to be released unless required in another case.

The prosecution case

The case arose from FIR No. 139 of 2006, registered on 12 March 2006 at Police Station Sukheki, District Hafizabad, under sections 302, 148, 149 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

Complainant Badar Zaman alleged that at about 6:00 p.m. he was returning to his village with his paternal uncle Walayat Hussain, Farhad Khushnood and Alam Sher after offering Fateha at the graves of the deceased's parents.

Near Dera Sohawa, Mujahid alias Mujahidi, Nadeem alias Deemi, Noor Muhammad, Saqlain alias Sakku, Sarfaraz alias Sarfu and three unidentified armed persons allegedly emerged from a haveli.

The prosecution attributed separate firing roles to five accused. Noor Muhammad allegedly fired first and struck the deceased in the chest. Mujahid allegedly fired at the left side of his body. Nadeem was accused of firing at the right side of the chest. Saqlain allegedly fired at the left side of the chest, and Sarfaraz was accused of causing an injury above the right upper thigh with a .44-bore rifle.

Noor Muhammad allegedly fired again below the navel. The accused were then said to have fired indiscriminately, causing multiple injuries and the death of Walayat Hussain at the scene.

The alleged motive was a history of blood feud and previous murders involving members of the two sides. Muhammad Sarwar, Zulfiqar Ali and Sultan Ahmad were accused of abetment.

Trial and High Court decisions

Muhammad Sarwar, Zulfiqar Ali and Sultan Ahmad were initially arrested but were acquitted by the trial court under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Mujahid and Nadeem were later arrested and tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Hafizabad.

On 29 March 2012, Mujahid was convicted under section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to death as Ta'zir. Nadeem was convicted under the same provision and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Each was ordered to pay Rs. 100,000 as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased under section 544-A CrPC, with a further six months' simple imprisonment in default.

The Lahore High Court decided their appeal and Murder Reference No. 166 of 2012 on 1 March 2016. It maintained both convictions but reduced Mujahid's death sentence to life imprisonment. Nadeem's life sentence remained intact.

The convicts approached the Supreme Court. Complainant Badar Zaman filed a separate petition seeking enhancement of their sentences to death.

Who is a chance witness?

The Supreme Court described a chance witness as a person who claims to have seen an occurrence at a place where, in the ordinary course of residence, business, occupation or daily routine, that person would not be expected to be present.

Such evidence is not automatically false or legally inadmissible. Its reliability depends on whether the circumstances explaining the witness's presence are satisfactory, confidence-inspiring and acceptable to the judicial conscience.

The label therefore does not decide the case. The court must examine:

• where the witness ordinarily lives or works;
• why the witness was at the particular location;
• whether that reason is natural and probable;
• whether independent circumstances support the explanation; and
• whether the account fits the physical, medical and forensic evidence.

Why the two eyewitnesses were treated as chance witnesses

Badar Zaman admitted that he did not reside in Mouza Paar Lakhan and had no business there. Alam Sher similarly admitted that he had neither a residence nor a business concern at or near the place of occurrence.

Their presence was therefore outside the ordinary course of their residence and affairs.

They claimed that they had visited the graves of the deceased's parents to offer Fateha and were returning with him when the attack occurred.

The Court found no independent, reliable or confidence-inspiring material supporting this explanation. A bare assertion that they had gone to offer Fateha could not by itself establish their presence, particularly because both lived far from the spot.

In the circumstances, the explanation was easy to introduce into the prosecution narrative and did not sufficiently remove the doubt surrounding their presence.

An explanation of presence needs evidentiary support

The judgment does not mean that a religious or personal visit is inherently improbable. Nor does it require documentary proof of every ordinary movement.

The weakness arose from the complete factual setting: both witnesses admitted having no residence or business connection with the place, their presence was wholly accidental, the stated reason lacked independent support, and their account contained additional unnatural and uncorroborated features.

Courts should therefore avoid two extremes. A witness should not be rejected merely for being away from home, but a convenient explanation should not be accepted automatically when presence at the crime scene is a disputed foundational fact.

The firing account appeared unnaturally precise

Five accused were assigned separate firing roles with different weapons. The witnesses claimed to remember the sequence of the shots and the exact part of the deceased's body struck by each accused.

The Supreme Court asked whether it was humanly possible, during a sudden murderous attack involving Kalashnikovs and a .44-bore rifle, to observe, retain and later reproduce that level of detail naturally.

The Court found the minute attribution of every shot, sequence and bodily impact inconsistent with the ordinary observation of a chaotic firearm assault.

Detailed testimony is not unreliable merely because it is detailed. Its credibility depends on the opportunity to observe, duration of the event, number of assailants, speed and intensity of the attack, lighting, distance, fear, obstruction and consistency with objective evidence.

Here, the alleged precision appeared artificial when assessed against the scale and suddenness of the attack.

The survival of the alleged eyewitnesses also raised doubt

The prosecution itself alleged a long-standing blood feud between the parties.

The Court found it difficult to understand why five heavily armed persons allegedly determined to murder Walayat Hussain would deliberately leave his nephew and Alam Sher alive as eyewitnesses against them.

This circumstance was not used as an automatic rule that assailants always attack witnesses. Human conduct varies, and attackers may flee, miss, act selectively or be interrupted.

Its significance arose cumulatively with the unexplained presence of the witnesses, the highly detailed firing attribution, the physical recoveries and the absence of forensic weapon comparison.

Independent corroboration was essential in the circumstances

The prosecution attributed specific firing roles to five accused and also alleged indiscriminate firing by all of them.

Because the presence and testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses were doubtful, their verbal assertions required independent and confidence-inspiring corroboration connecting each accused with the role assigned.

Potential corroboration could have included:

• a recovered weapon matched with a crime empty;
• reliable forensic material;
• an admission or other incriminating conduct;
• a natural independent witness;
• objective evidence confirming positions and firing sequence; or
• another circumstance specifically connecting the accused with the offence.

The prosecution did not produce such evidence against Mujahid and Nadeem.

Crime empties did not fit the extensive-firing narrative

The investigating officer recovered only five 7.62-bore empties and two .44-bore empties from the scene.

The eyewitnesses had attributed at least one individual shot to each of five accused and then alleged extensive indiscriminate firing by all of them.

The Supreme Court found the limited number of recovered empties incompatible with that account of repeated firing by several persons armed with formidable weapons.

The number of empties is not always conclusive. Shells may be missed, removed, displaced or not ejected by certain weapons. But the prosecution must explain a material mismatch where its narrative depends on a large volume of fire and specific individual weapon use.

No satisfactory evidentiary explanation reconciled the physical recovery with the account given by the witnesses.

Recovered weapons were not sent for forensic comparison

Kalashnikovs were allegedly recovered on the pointation of Mujahid and Nadeem.

Those weapons were not sent to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency with the recovered crime empties to determine whether any empty had been fired from either weapon.

A recovery alone does not prove use in a particular offence. Where testable crime empties exist, ballistic comparison may provide important objective support or exclusion.

The failure to conduct that comparison left the alleged weapons unconnected with the scene and deprived the prosecution of potential corroboration for an already doubtful eyewitness account.

The judgment does not make ballistic matching an absolute legal requirement in every firearm case. Its absence became decisive in combination with unreliable ocular evidence and the mismatch between the alleged firing and recovered empties.

Medical evidence confirms injury but does not identify the shooter

The doctor recorded twelve firearm entry wounds with corresponding exits, along with grazing injuries.

The Supreme Court held that these injuries established firearm violence and the homicidal death of Walayat Hussain. They did not independently establish which accused fired which shot.

Medical evidence ordinarily confirms:

• the existence and nature of injuries;
• the probable kind of weapon;
• the cause and approximate time of death;
• entry and exit characteristics; and
• compatibility or inconsistency with an ocular version.

It does not, without reliable ocular or other substantive evidence, identify the assailant or prove an accused's participation.

Once the eyewitness account failed to inspire confidence, multiple injuries could not be used as a separate basis to conclude that every named accused participated as alleged.

Multiple injuries do not prove multiple identified assailants

The Court observed that a weapon such as a Kalashnikov can discharge several rounds within seconds. Multiple firearm injuries may therefore result from a single formidable weapon.

The presence of numerous wounds did not necessarily confirm the prosecution's division of those injuries among five different shooters.

This does not establish that a single weapon caused the injuries in the case. The point is evidentiary: medical multiplicity cannot replace proof identifying the person or persons who fired.

Where identity is disputed, the prosecution must connect the accused through trustworthy ocular, forensic or circumstantial evidence rather than infer the number and identity of assailants solely from wound count.

The cumulative effect created reasonable doubt

The Supreme Court did not base acquittal on one isolated technical defect. It assessed the combined effect of the prosecution's weaknesses:

• the witnesses had no ordinary residential or occupational reason to be at the scene;
• their Fateha explanation lacked independent support;
• their unusually precise allocation of shots and wounds appeared unnatural;
• the alleged assailants left the supposed eyewitnesses unharmed despite the claimed blood feud;
• only a limited number of empties was recovered despite alleged indiscriminate firing;
• recovered weapons were not sent for comparison with crime empties;
• the ocular account was not independently corroborated; and
• medical evidence proved firearm death but not the identity or individual role of either petitioner.

Together these circumstances created reasonable doubt about the participation of Mujahid and Nadeem.

Benefit of doubt is a legal obligation

Where evidence creates reasonable doubt about an accused's participation, the court is legally required to resolve that doubt in the accused's favour.

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt through trustworthy and confidence-inspiring evidence. An accused is not required to establish an alternative account of the occurrence.

The benefit of doubt follows when material discrepancies, unnatural features and evidentiary gaps make the prosecution version unsafe for conviction.

The sentence-enhancement petition

Badar Zaman had sought enhancement of the sentences from life imprisonment to death.

Once the Supreme Court acquitted Mujahid and Nadeem, no sentence remained capable of enhancement. Criminal Petition No. 417-L of 2016 therefore became infructuous and was dismissed.

The Court did not merely choose life imprisonment over death. It found the evidence insufficient to sustain guilt itself.

Practical guidance for defence counsel

Where the prosecution relies on a witness who had no ordinary connection with the location, defence counsel should examine:

• the witness's residence, work and daily routine;
• the exact reason given for presence;
• whether that reason appeared in the earliest version;
• independent material supporting the explanation;
• travel time, distance and opportunity to observe;
• the sequence and duration of the attack;
• whether the level of detail claimed is humanly natural;
• the number and bore of crime empties;
• recovery and forensic testing of alleged weapons;
• consistency with medical evidence; and
• whether medical evidence is being misused to prove identity.

The argument should address the cumulative evidentiary picture rather than treating every defect as an unrelated technicality.

Practical guidance for investigators and prosecutors

Investigators should record and verify why a witness from another place was at the scene. Available travel, communication, accompanying-person or location evidence should be preserved where relevant.

Crime empties must be carefully collected, mapped, sealed and linked with recovered weapons through timely forensic comparison.

Where several shooters are alleged, the prosecution should avoid artificial precision unsupported by physical evidence. Each person's alleged role should be tested against medical findings, weapon type, crime empties and the witness's actual opportunity to observe.

Medical evidence should be used for its proper confirmatory purpose. It cannot repair an unreliable identification or replace missing proof connecting a particular accused to the attack.

Final order

Criminal Petition No. 356-L of 2016 was converted into an appeal and allowed.

The convictions and sentences of Mujahid alias Mujahidi and Nadeem alias Deemi were set aside. Both were acquitted by benefit of doubt and ordered to be released immediately unless required in another case.

Criminal Petition No. 417-L of 2016 seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed.

The judgment was announced in open court at Islamabad on 24 September 2026 and is approved for reporting.

Conclusion

Mujahid alias Mujahidi v The State gives a structured explanation of how courts should assess chance witnesses in murder trials. A witness's accidental presence must be supported by a natural and confidence-inspiring explanation, particularly where the remaining account displays improbable precision and lacks objective corroboration.

The judgment also draws a firm evidentiary line around medical evidence. Firearm wounds may prove homicide, but they do not identify the shooter. When ocular evidence is unreliable, medical evidence cannot be transformed from corroboration into substantive proof of individual participation.

The ruling ultimately rests on cumulative reasonable doubt arising from witness presence, human probability, physical recoveries, missing ballistic comparison and the proper limits of medical evidence.

This commentary is independent legal analysis for research and general information. The supplied judgment, applicable legislation and later judicial treatment should be checked before reliance in proceedings.