Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

Case reference

Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Quetta and others

Case
Civil Petitions Nos. 4364 and 4391 of 2024
Citation
Approved for reporting; reported citation not yet assigned
Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decision
March 11, 2026
Bench
Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Justice Musarrat Hilali
Judgment authored by
Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar
Result
Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; Tribunal judgment set aside; de novo inquiry with forensic examination directed within three months
Open judgment summary

Case at a glance

Case at a glance

Case
Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Quetta and others
Case numbers
Civil Petitions Nos. 4364 and 4391 of 2024
Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdiction)
Decision date
11 March 2026
Bench
Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Justice Musarrat Hilali
Judgment author
Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar
Status
Approved for reporting; reported citation not yet assigned
Judgment under challenge
Balochistan Service Tribunal judgment dated 25 July 2024 in Service Appeals Nos. 304 and 382 of 2023
Central issue
Whether guilt could stand where disputed signatures were never forensically examined despite the inquiry officer's own recommendation
Outcome
Fresh inquiry within three months after hearing and forensic examination; reinstatement subject to the result

The ruling in one sentence

In Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a major disciplinary penalty could not safely rest on a disputed signature that the inquiry officer considered necessary to verify but never sent for forensic examination, particularly where the inquiry findings and personal-hearing record were themselves contradictory.

The Court converted both civil petitions into appeals, allowed them, set aside the Balochistan Service Tribunal judgment, and ordered a de novo inquiry within three months after a proper hearing and forensic examination of the disputed signatures and documents. It expressly made reinstatement subject to the result of that fresh inquiry.

Why this judgment matters

This is an important service-law and evidence judgment for three reasons.

First, it treats a departmental inquiry as a quasi-judicial process. An inquiry officer is not merely collecting allegations for the department. The officer must act impartially, disclose and test the material relied upon, allow a meaningful defence, and reach findings that logically follow from the evidence.

Second, the judgment explains that a Service Tribunal is not always confined to the incomplete record produced before it. Under section 5 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974, the Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court for deciding appeals and possesses powers associated with attendance, examination on oath, production of documents, and commissions. Where a decisive factual issue genuinely requires further proof, the Tribunal may record evidence instead of affirming a defective inquiry mechanically.

Third, the Court placed forensic authentication at the centre of the case because the disputed payment challans were the alleged link between the officers and the missing public revenue. Once the inquiry officer accepted that the signature was denied and recommended forensic examination, guilt could not coherently be treated as proved while that very examination remained undone.

Case at a glance

  • Case: Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Quetta and others
  • Proceedings: Civil Petitions Nos. 4364 and 4391 of 2024
  • Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan, Appellate Jurisdiction
  • Bench: Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Justice Musarrat Hilali
  • Judgment author: Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar
  • Decision date: 11 March 2026
  • Judgment under challenge: Consolidated Balochistan Service Tribunal judgment dated 25 July 2024 in Service Appeals Nos. 304 and 382 of 2023
  • Status: Approved for reporting; reported citation not yet assigned
  • Result: Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; Tribunal judgment set aside; matter remanded for a de novo inquiry within three months

How the controversy arose

The dispute concerned mutation entries relating to land in Dera Bugti. The departmental allegation was that revenue officials had treated a transaction as correction of the revenue record rather than as a gift, or hiba, with the result that only Rs. 200 was deposited instead of an alleged government levy of Rs. 1,381,282.

Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti was serving as a Patwari. His case was that the relevant mouzas were not within his circle, he had not signed the mutation, and he had neither received nor handled the alleged tax amount. The personal-hearing officer later concluded that he was not the halqa Patwari for the land, had signed nothing, and could not have caused the mutation. Despite that assessment, he was dismissed from service on 15 June 2023.

Behram Khan was serving as Tehsildar, Dera Bugti. He denied signing the payment challans and maintained that the challan relied upon against him was fake. The inquiry officer acknowledged that the signature required forensic verification and recommended that the Board of Revenue arrange examination of the documents. Yet the same report proceeded to find him guilty and recommend a major penalty. He too was dismissed from service on 15 June 2023.

The Service Tribunal dismissed both appeals. Its judgment treated the misconduct and financial manipulation as proved, but did not address the inquiry officer's own recommendation for forensic examination or explain how guilt could be sustained without resolving the disputed signature.

The central contradiction in the inquiry report

The Supreme Court regarded the unresolved signature as the main evidentiary defect.

An inquiry officer may reject a denial if reliable material proves that the denial is false. But the officer cannot say that scientific verification is needed, admit that the necessary facility is unavailable, recommend forensic examination, and then proceed as though the disputed signature has already been authenticated. Those positions cannot logically stand together.

The contradiction was not peripheral. The challans were said to connect Behram Khan with collection and non-deposit of the government levy. If the signatures were genuine, they could materially support the charge. If they were forged, the allegation required a different factual inquiry to identify the person responsible. Authentication therefore went to the foundation of the case rather than to a minor procedural detail.

The Court observed that the inquiry could have been adjourned briefly while the competent authority arranged the forensic analysis. Even after the report was submitted, the competent authority could have ordered a fresh inquiry on that point before imposing the final penalty. Neither course was adopted.

A departmental inquiry is quasi-judicial

The judgment describes the role of an inquiry officer or committee as comparable to a quasi-judicial function in proceedings under labour law and civil-service law.

That classification has practical consequences. The inquiry must be conducted by an impartial and unbiased officer. The delinquent employee must receive a reasonable opportunity to answer the charge. The departmental representative must produce the relevant witnesses and documents in an orderly manner, even where the employee does not participate and the matter proceeds ex parte.

Where the employee does participate, evidence should not be reduced to an informal question-and-answer exercise that obscures what each witness actually stated. The Court directed attention to recording witness statements in full and allowing the employee to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the department.

The point is not ceremonial compliance. A major penalty such as dismissal affects livelihood, reputation, pensionary consequences, and future public employment. The findings must therefore be traceable to evidence that was disclosed, tested, and evaluated through a fair procedure.

The department bears the primary burden

The Supreme Court held that the primary burden in disciplinary proceedings rests on the employer or department alleging misconduct. The case must be supported by clear and credible evidence rather than by the employee's inability to disprove an unverified accusation.

This corrects a recurring error in service inquiries. Once a charge sheet is issued, some proceedings drift into asking the employee to establish innocence while the department relies on unsigned papers, summaries, or assumptions. The lawful sequence is the opposite: the department must first prove the material facts constituting misconduct, after which the employee's explanation and rebuttal are assessed against that proof.

The Court also emphasised natural justice, due process, absence of bias, and the need for due diligence before a finding of guilt. An inquiry report prepared cursorily cannot become reliable merely because the competent authority repeats its conclusion or the Tribunal describes the process as meticulous.

An important caution about the standard of proof

The judgment refers both to clear and credible evidence in disciplinary proceedings and to the criminal-law presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt. Those passages should be read carefully.

The case did not require the Supreme Court to formulate a universal standard of proof for every departmental inquiry. Its actual decision turned on a narrower and decisive failure: the department had not authenticated the disputed signatures, the inquiry report contradicted itself, and the Tribunal ignored that contradiction.

It would therefore overstate the ruling to claim that every service inquiry must now be decided on the criminal standard of proof. What the judgment clearly establishes is that the department carries the initial burden, major findings require reliable evidence, and an indispensable evidentiary gap cannot be filled by presumption or by shifting the burden to the employee.

Articles 59 and 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat

The Supreme Court referred to two recognised evidentiary routes for resolving disputed handwriting.

Article 59 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 treats the opinion of a person specially skilled in handwriting identification as a relevant fact. Article 84 permits comparison of a disputed signature, writing, or seal with writing admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court, and also permits the court to obtain a specimen from a person present before it for comparison.

The Court used these provisions as guiding principles for resolving the factual dispute. It observed that the Tribunal could have sought forensic verification or, if it considered that course unnecessary, could have addressed comparison of the signatures within its lawful evidentiary powers.

The decision does not make expert opinion conclusive. A forensic report remains evidence to be evaluated with the underlying documents, admitted specimens, chain of custody, methodology, and the rest of the record. The error here was that the need for verification was identified but never carried out, while guilt was nevertheless treated as established.

The Service Tribunal's power to record evidence

Section 5 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974 empowers the Tribunal to confirm, set aside, vary, or modify the order under appeal. For deciding an appeal, the Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court and has powers corresponding to those under the Code of Civil Procedure, including compelling attendance, examining a person on oath, requiring documents, and issuing commissions.

The Supreme Court held that, as the first judicial fact-finding forum in service matters, the Tribunal is not barred from recording evidence where dire need and extreme necessity require it. This is a case-specific power, not a mandatory step in every service appeal.

The distinction matters. A Tribunal need not reopen routine evidence merely because one party requests it. But where the entire disciplinary conclusion depends on whether a signature is genuine and the inquiry record expressly leaves that issue unresolved, declining to obtain the necessary proof can defeat the Tribunal's role as the ultimate fact-finding forum.

Why the Tribunal judgment could not stand

The Tribunal focused on the seriousness of the alleged financial manipulation, the petitioners' alleged failure to rebut the charge, and proportionality of punishment. Those matters could become relevant only after the foundational facts were proved.

It did not answer the prior question: who signed the challans and what reliable evidence established that fact? It also did not reconcile Ellahi Bakhsh's dismissal with the personal-hearing finding that he was not the relevant halqa Patwari and had signed nothing.

By treating the accusation as established without resolving these defects, the Tribunal effectively allowed the seriousness of the allegation to replace proof of the allegation. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment because the missing forensic examination and contradictory departmental record went to the credibility of the entire exercise.

The final relief was a remand, not an acquittal

The petitioners succeeded in having the Tribunal judgment set aside, but the Supreme Court did not finally declare that no misconduct occurred.

The matter was remanded to the competent authority or department for a de novo inquiry. The department must provide an ample opportunity of hearing, arrange forensic examination of the signatures and documents, and complete the process within three months. The Court expressly stated that reinstatement would be subject to the result of the inquiry.

That qualification is legally important. The ruling removes an unsafe adjudicatory foundation; it does not immunise either officer from a properly proved charge. A genuine forensic result and other admissible evidence may support exoneration, a fresh penalty, or findings against a different person, depending on the complete record.

The petitioners also had a duty to identify the defect

The Supreme Court noted that the disputed-signature issue should have been considered by the Tribunal, but also observed that the petitioner was equally responsible for not drawing the Tribunal's attention to it.

This is a practical warning for service-law counsel. A decisive contradiction in an inquiry report should be pleaded specifically, tied to the relevant document and requested relief, and pressed before the appellate forum. A later court may correct a serious omission, but a litigant should not assume that the forum will independently reconstruct every evidentiary objection from a bulky departmental record.

Practical guidance for inquiry officers and departments

  • Serve the charge, statement of allegations, relied-upon documents, and witness list through a verifiable process.
  • Identify every ingredient of the alleged misconduct and the evidence intended to prove it.
  • Produce witnesses and record their evidence in a form that permits meaningful cross-examination.
  • Preserve original documents and an auditable chain of custody where handwriting, signatures, stamps, or electronic records are disputed.
  • Obtain admitted and specimen signatures through a lawful process before sending material for forensic examination.
  • Do not combine a recommendation for essential further investigation with a final finding that assumes the missing result.
  • Address the employee's defence and every material contradiction through reasons, not conclusions.
  • Keep the inquiry finding, personal-hearing recommendation, and final competent-authority order logically connected.

Practical guidance for employees and counsel

  • Deny a disputed signature or document clearly and at the earliest available stage; a vague denial is easier to disregard.
  • Request inspection of the original document and identify reliable admitted signatures for comparison.
  • Ask for forensic examination where authenticity is genuinely determinative, and explain why visual comparison alone would be unsafe.
  • Establish the employee's actual posting, assigned circle, legal authority, access to the record, and role on the relevant date.
  • Challenge failure to serve the charge sheet, statement of allegations, documents, or witness evidence with proof of the resulting prejudice.
  • Cross-examine the departmental witnesses on custody of documents, receipt of money, preparation of challans, and the official route for deposit.
  • Raise every decisive evidentiary defect expressly before the Service Tribunal and seek use of its section 5 powers where necessary.

What the judgment does not decide

The ruling does not declare forensic examination mandatory whenever a signature is disputed. The necessity depends on the importance of the document, the available admitted material, the quality of other evidence, and the manner in which the dispute arises.

It does not hold that a Service Tribunal must record fresh evidence in every appeal. The Supreme Court described that power as dependent on dire need, extreme necessity, and the circumstances of the particular case.

It does not finally exonerate Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti or Behram Khan. Their reinstatement and service consequences remain tied to the outcome of the fresh inquiry.

It does not make a forensic expert the final decision-maker. Expert opinion must still be examined by the competent authority or Tribunal with the complete evidentiary record.

It does not permit an employee to remain silent about a known defect before the Tribunal and automatically claim relief later. The judgment expressly noticed the petitioner's failure to invite the Tribunal's attention to the crucial point.

Critical legal analysis

The strongest part of the judgment is its insistence on logical consistency. A public authority cannot acknowledge that the decisive document remains unauthenticated and, in the same report, treat its authorship as established. Requiring the missing forensic step is not excessive technicality; it is the minimum needed to connect the alleged actor with the alleged financial misconduct.

The recognition of the Tribunal's fact-finding power is equally useful. Service tribunals should not become passive reviewers of defective files where a limited evidentiary step could resolve the central dispute and achieve finality. At the same time, the Court correctly confined that course to cases of genuine necessity rather than converting every service appeal into a new trial.

The judgment would have been clearer if it had expressly separated the criminal standard of proof from the standard governing disciplinary proceedings. Its references to prosecution, presumption of innocence, probability, and proof beyond reasonable doubt sit together without a full doctrinal explanation. The safer reading is the narrow one supported by the result: the employer bears the burden and cannot sustain a major penalty where essential proof is missing.

The remand is also more defensible than outright exoneration. The record raised a serious allegation concerning public revenue, but the original process was incapable of identifying responsibility reliably. A fresh inquiry preserves both sides of public justice: the officers cannot be punished on an unverified document, and the State is not prevented from proving genuine misconduct through lawful evidence.

Conclusion

Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan is a significant Supreme Court authority on departmental inquiries, forensic handwriting evidence, the burden on the employer, and the fact-finding powers of a Service Tribunal.

Its central lesson is direct. The gravity of an allegation cannot substitute for proof, and a recommendation for forensic verification cannot coexist with a final finding that assumes the disputed signature is genuine. Where the missing evidence is decisive, the inquiry and appellate forum must obtain it, test it, and give reasons based on a procedurally fair record.

Judgment record

The complete court-issued judgment is available in the connected judgment-library entry for public viewing and download. The case number, parties, bench, decision date, statutory references, reasoning, outcome, and reporting status were checked against that primary document.

This commentary is independent legal analysis for research and general information. The official judgment, current statutory text, service rules, inquiry record, and facts of the individual case should be verified before reliance in proceedings.

Primary-source materials

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Court documents, statutory provisions, official notifications, government documents, and external official sources relied on or relevant to this article.

Judgment PDF

Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Quetta and others

Ellahi Bakhsh Bugti and Behram Khan v Government of Balochistan - Official Supreme Court Judgment.pdf · PDF · 72 KB

Research integrity

Editorial and source record

Author
Shahbaz Shah, Advocate High Court
Legal review
Shahbaz Shah, Advocate High Court
Sources checked
August 14, 2026
Primary materials
5 recorded on this page
Corrections
Case title, connected petition numbers, parties, bench, decision date, inquiry history, statutory provisions, forensic-evidence reasoning, relief, reporting status, and PDF file were verified against the court-issued judgment dated 11 March 2026.
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Written and published by Shahbaz Shah

This article forms part of an independent journal focused on practical analysis of Pakistani law, courts, and legal institutions.

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