Internet Access Is a Fundamental Right for Children Too: Supreme Court of India

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

The Supreme Court of India has recognised the right to access and use the internet as a fundamental right under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court expressly extended that protection to children, irrespective of their age, while preserving proportionate measures to keep them safe online. (Paragraph 292, read with paragraphs 299–302.)

The ruling appears in the order dated 15 October 2026 in Just Rights for Children Alliance & another v. S. Harish & others, 2026 INSC 1149. The bench comprised Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. V. Chandran. The proceeding concerns safeguards against Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material, referred to in the order as CSEAM.

Relevant part of the judgment: paragraph 292

The following is the relevant part of the judgment on the right to access and use the internet. This is an extract, not the full judgment. Paragraph 292 appears on printed page 105; the surrounding reasoning and qualifications should also be read.

In view of the foregoing, we have no hesitation in saying that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Our children, irrespective of their age enjoy the same rights, and to deny the same altogether would be as absurd as saying children below a certain age do not have a conscience worth protecting or a freedom of speech worth expressing. The safety of our children and their freedom are not at odds with each other. Our children are entitled to both.

Read or download the full judgment (PDF). For the limits on age-based measures and harmful content, see paragraphs 299–302 of the same judgment.

Why the Court linked internet access to constitutional rights

The Court's reasoning starts with the nature of the harm that child protection measures must address. In paragraph 284, it says measures for children's safety must be directed at harmful material and those responsible for it, rather than at children themselves. Paragraph 285 explains that the wrong lies with those who create, circulate, sell or seek abusive material, and with platforms that fail to act against it.

The Court then connects internet access with the ability to learn, communicate and receive information. Paragraph 287 discusses freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), including the right to receive and impart information and ideas. Paragraph 288 emphasises the internet's role in education and participation, including for children in remote areas and children with special needs.

This reasoning matters because a broad exclusion can remove a child's access to useful information and support along with the risks it seeks to prevent. The Court's approach requires safety measures to take account of the value of the activity being restricted. (Paragraphs 284–288.)

How the order treats earlier internet-rights decisions

The order discusses Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, in paragraphs 289–290. It explains that the earlier decision protected the exercise of speech and business through the internet under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), while leaving open the separate question of a fundamental right to internet access itself.

Paragraph 291 then refers to Pragya Prasun & others v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 599, concerning accessible digital KYC. The Court draws on that decision's recognition of digital access as intrinsic to life under Article 21 and the need for an inclusive digital ecosystem.

Against that background, paragraph 292 expressly recognises the right to access and use the internet under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a). The relevant legal development is therefore the language and reasoning of this order; it should be read alongside the earlier authorities discussed by the Court. (Paragraphs 289–292.)

Why blanket bans on children concerned the Court

The Court questions whether excluding children from online spaces actually solves the problem. It reasons that blanket restrictions can push them towards less regulated platforms or make them conceal their online activity. That may reduce the chance of a child approaching a parent, teacher or other trusted adult when something goes wrong. (Paragraphs 293–298.)

The concern is practical as well as constitutional. If children fear punishment merely for being online, a child who encounters abuse may hesitate to seek help. The Court therefore favours measures that make platforms safer and support reporting, rather than treating every child's access as the source of the danger. These are the Court's reasons for its approach in this proceeding. (Paragraphs 293–298.)

Age assurance also raises a separate privacy concern. Paragraph 286 discusses the implications of identifying users across the board and collecting sensitive information on a continuing basis. Its reasoning calls for attention to the privacy and surveillance costs of a proposed protection mechanism, alongside its intended benefit.

Age-based safeguards and harmful-content restrictions remain possible

The declaration in paragraph 292 must be read with the qualification that follows. Paragraph 299 states:

However, this does not mean that there should be no age-based restrictions. We acknowledge that, some form of safeguards are necessary for the safety our children online and the moderation of the content accessible at their fingertips.

The wording above follows the supplied judgment. Paragraph 300 discusses parental consent, guidance and oversight, together with a dedicated child mode. Paragraph 301 identifies measures such as private accounts by default, restrictions on contact or messages from unknown adults, moderation of advertising and content, and reasonable parental verification for preteens. The Court leaves the detailed modalities to the Union of India.

Paragraph 302 expressly clarifies that the Union may restrict children's access to specific categories of inherently harmful content or services, including adult-content websites. The order therefore recognises a right to internet access while allowing targeted and proportionate protection. It does not direct unrestricted access to every online service. (Paragraphs 299–302.)

Read these qualifications in the full judgment.

The wider proceeding concerns platform responsibility

The internet-rights passage forms part of a much broader order addressing the detection, removal and reporting of CSEAM. The order examines a national database of verified hashes and URLs, reporting and grievance mechanisms, and accountability for intermediaries. Paragraph 316 brings together the proposed framework and directions.

A hash is a digital identifier that can assist in matching material already identified as unlawful. The Court's discussion distinguishes a database of hashes and URLs from storing the underlying abusive material. It also stresses verification and safeguards against mistaken removal. (Paragraph 316, database framework.)

There is an express limit on the database's purpose. Paragraph 303 says the hash-and-URL mechanism is to be used for detecting and removing CSEAM, rather than being repurposed for general censorship. This limit complements the Court's insistence that protection should target the harmful material.

Digital safety education is part of the protection framework

The Court also addresses the ability of children and adults to recognise risks and respond to abuse. Paragraphs 304–315 discuss digital safety, age-appropriate education, support for victims and the responsibilities of educational institutions and parents.

The measures in paragraph 315 include teaching children about personal safety, consent, privacy and reporting; training teachers and staff; and helping parents understand available safety settings and signs of distress. The Court stresses that children should be encouraged to report incidents without fear of reproach. It also calls for reasonable and proportionate filtering of harmful content on institutional devices and networks.

These measures show how the Court connects freedom with practical protection. The order places responsibility on governments, platforms, educational institutions and adults to make access safer. (Paragraphs 312–315.)

What the Union of India must do next

In paragraph 317, the Court directs the Union of India, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Ministry of Law and Justice, to take appropriate action to oversee and implement the measures, suggestions and safeguards discussed in the order.

Paragraph 318 calls for appropriate guidelines, Standard Operating Procedures and suitable amendments to the IT Act and IT Rules where necessary. This is a direction to take the required implementation steps; the order should not be described as itself enacting every proposed statutory or regulatory change.

The Union must file an affidavit stating the progress made and steps taken by the next hearing. The Court listed the matter for 10 December 2026. The proceeding remains under judicial consideration. (Paragraphs 319–320.)

What readers should take from the internet-rights passage

The main holding is clear: paragraph 292 recognises internet access and use as a fundamental right and expressly includes children. Its application must account for the safeguards preserved in paragraphs 299–302.

The order does not announce a universal entitlement to a free device or free broadband. Nor should it be reported as striking down a particular named age-ban law. The relevant discussion sets out the Court's approach to children's access and proportionate protection in this continuing child-safety proceeding. Readers should use the full order to distinguish its constitutional reasoning, proposed implementation mechanisms and operative directions.

For readers in Pakistan, this is an Indian constitutional decision. Its reasoning may be useful for comparative discussion, but the declaration is made under the Constitution of India and should be identified as such.

Sources and full judgment

Just Rights for Children Alliance & another v. S. Harish & others — full judgment, 2026 INSC 1149, Supreme Court of India, order dated 15 October 2026, M.A. Nos. 2553–2554 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161–2162 of 2024.

The principal extract reproduced above is paragraph 292. Relevant context appears in paragraphs 284–291 and 299–303; digital safety education is addressed in paragraphs 304–315; the consolidated framework and concluding directions appear in paragraphs 316–320.

Frequently asked questions

Is internet access a fundamental right under this order?

Yes. Paragraph 292 recognises the right to access and use the internet under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

Does this right include children?

Yes. Paragraph 292 expressly says that children, irrespective of their age, enjoy the same rights and are entitled to both safety and freedom.

Does the Court prohibit all age-based safeguards?

No. Paragraphs 299–302 preserve proportionate safeguards, parental oversight, child modes and restrictions on inherently harmful content or services.

Where is the relevant passage in the judgment?

The central declaration is in paragraph 292, on printed page 105. Read it with paragraphs 284–291 and 299–303 for its reasoning and limits.

What is the correct judgment date and citation?

The order is dated 15 October 2026 and bears citation 2026 INSC 1149. The case is Just Rights for Children Alliance & another v. S. Harish & others.

Was the proceeding finally disposed of?

No. The Court called for a progress affidavit from the Union of India and listed the matter for 10 December 2026. The operative directions appear in paragraphs 317–320.