Supreme Court of India Grants Article 32 Bail After Nine Years in Custody

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

A stalled murder trial brought exceptional constitutional relief

The Supreme Court of India granted bail to Liakat Ali after nine years and two months in custody, with his murder trial still far from completion. Only twelve of thirty prosecution witnesses had been examined. The Court found that the delay was not attributable to him and that the proceedings were likely to take still more time.

In its order of 16 July 2026, the bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale exercised its powers under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The decision is significant both for the relief granted and for the Court’s express recognition that it would not ordinarily have entertained this route to bail. Order, signed order, pages 1–3.

What the Court had before it

Ali approached the Supreme Court through Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 99 of 2026. His grievance was the exceptionally slow progress of the trial during a lengthy period of incarceration. The order records that his earlier bail application had attained finality in 2024, but there had been no substantial progress even after that.

The State identified the alleged offences as Sections 302, 382 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence. Counsel for Ali also pointed to his youth at the time of the alleged occurrence; the Court described him as having been a teenager then.

The short order does not narrate the alleged crime in detail or assess each piece of prosecution evidence. Its central concern was continued detention while the trial remained unfinished. Order, signed order, pages 1–3.

Why another bail application was not the whole answer

The State argued that nothing prevented Ali from filing a fresh bail application before the appropriate court. It relied on the offences alleged against him and opposed intervention by the Supreme Court.

The bench acknowledged the ordinary position: in the normal course, it would not have entertained this petition. It nevertheless regarded the continued trial delay and prolonged incarceration as sufficiently serious to justify exercising Article 32 powers on these facts.

This distinction matters. The order is not a general invitation to bypass the usual bail process. It shows the Court departing from its ordinary approach because the duration of custody, the limited progress of the trial and the absence of fault on the accused’s part had become exceptional. Order, signed order, pages 2–3.

The record of delay mattered more than a bare custody figure

The Court did not consider nine years and two months in isolation. It placed that period alongside the examination of only twelve of thirty prosecution witnesses, the lack of substantial progress after the earlier bail proceedings, and the likelihood that the remaining trial would take further time.

Its finding that Ali was not responsible for the delay was also material. A long custody period caused by an accused’s own obstruction would present a different factual question from the one the Court accepted here. The order’s reasons therefore need to be read together, rather than reduced to a single numerical threshold.

For counsel presenting a delay-based claim, the useful record is the custody history and the actual progress of proceedings, including the reasons for adjournments. That is a practical inference from the facts the Court relied on, not a new documentary checklist prescribed by the bench. Order, signed order, pages 1–3.

Courts and prosecutors share responsibility for progress

The Supreme Court emphasized that when an accused remains in jail, both the court and the prosecuting agency must expedite the trial. Continued detention cannot make the pace of proceedings a matter of indifference to either institution.

The order also recalled the presumption of innocence and the principle favouring bail over imprisonment before guilt has been determined. These principles formed part of the Court’s assessment of a person still facing trial, rather than serving a sentence imposed after conviction.

The reference to circumstantial evidence did not amount to a ruling that such evidence was legally incapable of proving murder. The Court did not decide guilt or acquit Ali. It addressed whether his continued custody could be sustained in the circumstances before it. Order, signed order, pages 2–3.

The relief granted and the limits of the decision

The Supreme Court granted bail and left appropriate conditions to the concerned Trial Court. It allowed the writ petition and disposed of pending applications, if any. The accompanying record of proceedings confirms that the petition was allowed in terms of the signed order.

No fixed bond amount, specified number of sureties or deadline for completion of the trial appears in the signed order. Those terms should not be added to its account. Nor does the order establish an automatic entitlement to bail after a particular number of years.

The description of Ali as a teenager does not itself establish that he was legally a juvenile at the relevant time. The Court did not determine a juvenile-justice claim. His age was one feature of the circumstances that informed this bail decision. Order, signed order, pages 2–4; record of proceedings, pages 5–6.

How lawyers in Pakistan should use the case

Liakat Ali is an Indian Supreme Court order under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. It does not directly govern the statutory-delay provisions of Pakistani bail law. Its value to a Pakistani reader lies in the reasoning about prolonged pretrial detention, responsibility for delay and the need to examine the actual pace of a trial.

For the distinct Pakistani statutory framework, see our analysis of Chaudhary Shahzaib Shamim and delay-based bail under Section 497 Cr.P.C.. The applicable provision and its exceptions must be addressed independently; the Indian order cannot replace that inquiry.

The result in Liakat Ali was specific and practical: bail in an exceptionally delayed trial, on conditions to be fixed by the Trial Court, while the prosecution remained to be decided. Order, signed order, pages 1–4.

Sources

• Complete order and record of proceedings.
• Matching court order PDF hosted by LiveLaw.
• LiveLaw case report and reporting citation.
• Supreme Court of India official judgment-date search. Search 16 July 2026 and W.P. (Crl.) 99/2026.
• Searchable judgment summary and full case particulars.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Supreme Court decide in Liakat Ali’s case?

It granted bail under Article 32 after nine years and two months in custody, having considered the limited progress of the trial, the expected further delay and the absence of fault on Ali’s part. Order, signed order, pages 1–3.

Did the Court create an automatic nine-year rule for bail?

No. The Court relied on the combined circumstances and expressly acknowledged that it would not ordinarily have entertained this petition. Order, signed order, pages 2–3.

How many prosecution witnesses had been examined?

The order records that twelve of thirty prosecution witnesses had been examined when the Court considered the matter. Order, signed order, page 2.

Was Liakat Ali acquitted of murder?

No. The Court granted bail during the proceedings. It did not determine guilt or terminate the prosecution. Order, signed order, pages 2–4.

Who was to set the conditions of bail?

The concerned Trial Court was to impose appropriate conditions. The Supreme Court’s signed order does not specify a bond amount or number of sureties. Order, signed order, page 3.

Does calling the petitioner a teenager establish a juvenile-justice finding?

No. The order describes his age generally but does not determine that he was a juvenile or decide relief under juvenile-justice legislation. Order, signed order, pages 2–3.