PhD Deadline Extensions Must Be Assessed Under HEC Policy: FCC Sets Aside IIUI Refusal

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

PhD deadline expiry does not end the extension inquiry

The Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan has set aside International Islamic University, Islamabad’s rejection of Mst. Shehla Khaliq's request for time to submit her PhD thesis. The Court held that expiry of the ordinary degree-completion period did not, by itself, answer whether an exceptional extension was permissible under clause 3.12(iv) of HEC's Graduate Education Policy, 2023. The competent university authority had to assess the causes of delay under that framework. Judgment, paragraphs 8–9 and 24–30.

The judgment, dated 1 October 2026 and approved for reporting, was delivered in F.C.P.L.A. No. 59 of 2025, Mst. Shehla Khaliq v. President, International Islamic University and another. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi authored it on a bench with Justice Muhammad Karim Khan Agha.

The relief is a fresh decision, not an automatic extension. The FCC did not accept the thesis, assess its academic quality or award a PhD. It required IIUI to provide a reasonable hearing and pass a reasoned order, preferably within thirty days of receiving a certified copy, with the resulting decision communicated to the Court through the Registrar. Judgment, paragraphs 24 and 29–30.

The scholar's chronology and the disputed delay

Shehla Khaliq enrolled in IIUI's PhD in Law in Fall 2015. She completed coursework in Spring 2016, and its result was declared on 19 July 2016. The governing rules required a comprehensive examination within ninety days of completion of coursework. Her examination took place on 26 and 30 December 2016; its result was notified on 26 July 2017. Judgment, paragraphs 2.

Her synopsis then passed through the Board of Studies and Board of Faculty, with amendments suggested and a supervisor assigned. The Board of Advanced Studies and Research approved it on 7 February 2019, approximately eight months after the Board of Faculty meeting. These institutional steps were relevant because she relied on the time taken by the university as part of her explanation for missing the ultimate deadline. Judgment, paragraphs 2 and 25.

She also relied on marriage and relocation to District Lakki Marwat, limited connectivity and research access, caring for two children, and COVID-19 restrictions affecting the university and its facilities. These were circumstances advanced in support of the request; the judgment did not declare that each was proved to justify a particular number of additional months. Their actual contribution required assessment on the record. Judgment, paragraphs 2 and 25–26.

According to IIUI, the applicable completion period expired on 31 August 2023. She approached the university to submit her completed thesis on 29 August 2024. Her formal representation, received on 21 October 2024, included a thesis copy, plagiarism report and supervisor's completion letter. IIUI rejected the request through a regret letter dated 6 May 2025. Her writ petition was dismissed, leading to the FCC appeal. Judgment, paragraphs 2, 4 and 24.

What HEC clause 3.12 provides

The FCC reproduced clause 3.12 of the Graduate Education Policy, 2023. It sets the ordinary PhD completion range at three to eight years, subject to the exception in subclause (iv). It also identifies the completion notification, rather than merely the date of thesis submission, as relevant to calculating the degree timeline. Judgment, paragraphs 7.

Subclause (iv) provides a mechanism for examining an extension claim where the scholar cannot secure the degree within the prescribed period. The university may constitute an appropriate authority to determine the causes of delay. Where circumstances beyond the student's control amount to force majeure, it may grant an extension in accordance with the relevant duration-limiting factors. The clause also requires corrective measures where process or administrative reasons caused the delay. Judgment, paragraphs 7–8 and 24.

The policy therefore distinguishes the ordinary deadline from the exceptional inquiry after that deadline. If expiry alone were treated as a complete answer, the exceptional mechanism would never receive the consideration for which it exists. The FCC rejected that approach in Shehla Khaliq's case. Judgment, paragraphs 24.

The mechanism also covers students enrolled before 2023

The footnote to clause 3.12 expressly addresses students enrolled before the policy's introduction. The Court held that the prescribed procedure extends to those earlier scholars, including Shehla Khaliq, who enrolled in 2015. Judgment, paragraphs 7–8.

This does not mean the FCC retrospectively erased every earlier academic deadline. It means her request had to be examined through the policy's extension procedure rather than excluded merely because she joined before 2023 or had exceeded the ordinary period. The authority still had to determine whether her circumstances met the applicable criteria. Judgment, paragraphs 8 and 24.

For scholars and university administrators, the practical task is to identify the applicable policy, the date from which the ordinary period runs, the relief requested and the actual reasons for delay. Earlier enrolment alone did not remove this petitioner from the extension mechanism.

A right to consideration is not a right to extension

The FCC expressly said that clause 3.12(iv) did not give the petitioner an automatic entitlement. IIUI was not required to accept every explanation advanced. It was required to consider the causes of delay and determine whether they fell within the policy, individually or cumulatively. Judgment, paragraphs 24–25.

That is why the Court left the ultimate decision with the competent university authority. The thesis, plagiarism report and supervisor's letter were relevant because the requested extension concerned submission and processing of work said to be complete. Whether those materials met academic and regulatory requirements remained for IIUI. Judgment, paragraphs 26.

A headline saying that the FCC granted Shehla Khaliq a PhD extension would be inaccurate. The successful appeal secured a fresh, lawful assessment and removed the defective refusal; it did not settle the final academic outcome. Judgment, paragraphs 29–30.

Judicial review depends on the decision, not just the institution

The High Court had treated the dispute as a purely academic matter governed by non-statutory internal rules. The FCC held that the nature of the challenged decision first had to be identified. A decision does not become immune from review merely because a university or academic body makes it. Judgment, paragraphs 11–13 and 17.

Evaluating a thesis, assessing academic merit and applying specialist standards ordinarily call for judicial restraint. Examining whether a time-extension request was handled under the governing policy is a different question. The court may review whether the authority stayed within its powers, followed the applicable framework, respected procedural fairness and considered the relevant factors. Judgment, paragraphs 12 and 17.

Shehla Khaliq did not ask the High Court to assess her research. She challenged the process used to refuse permission to submit it. The FCC held that enforcing the policy's decision-making requirements would preserve university autonomy rather than replace academic judgment with judicial opinion. Judgment, paragraphs 13 and 27.

HEC regulation and university autonomy operate together

The judgment explains HEC's statutory mandate under section 10 of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002. That mandate includes policies, guiding principles, evaluation and standards for higher education. It cannot be reduced to mere financial assistance or informal advice. Judgment, paragraphs 6.

At the same time, HEC's functions do not displace the autonomy conferred on a university by its governing law. The FCC describes complementary roles: HEC supplies the applicable framework and standards; the competent university authority applies them to an individual case. Judicial review checks the legality of that exercise rather than taking over the academic decision. Judgment, paragraphs 7–9.

This was a finding about the policy and institutional framework before the Court. It should not be expanded into a proposition that every HEC circular has identical legal effect in every dispute or automatically overrides all university instruments.

Why the statutory character of IIUI's rules mattered

The FCC examined the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985 and its provisions for Statutes, Regulations and Rules. It explained that instruments duly framed and approved through the statutory mechanism derive their authority from the parent legislation. Such instruments cannot simply be equated with ordinary administrative instructions. Judgment, paragraphs 18–19 and 22–23.

The qualification concerning proper framing and approval is essential. The judgment does not confer statutory status on every document bearing the university's name. Counsel must identify the relevant instrument, its legal source and compliance with the prescribed making and approval procedure. Judgment, paragraphs 22.

The FCC also referred to the Islamabad High Court Full Bench judgment in International Islamic University, Islamabad and others v. Dr. Shameem Tariq and others, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1336, decided on 9 July 2015. That decision had considered IIUI's legal status and rules made under its governing Ordinance. The later High Court decision could not proceed on a contrary general premise without engaging with that authority. Judgment, paragraphs 19–20.

Judicial discipline: disagreement requires the proper bench

The Court addressed consistency within the same judicial institution. A bench ordinarily follows a principle settled by a co-equal or larger bench of the same court. If it doubts that view, it should explain its reasons and seek constitution of a larger bench through the Chief Justice, rather than disregard the earlier law. Judgment, paragraphs 20.

The FCC applied the same institutional discipline to its own precedents and discussed Article 189, referring to the binding effect of its legal principles on other courts, including the Supreme Court. It cited established authorities concerning proper bench strength and reconsideration. Judgment, paragraphs 21.

This does not say that one High Court automatically binds every other High Court. The discussion in paragraph 20 concerns judicial discipline within the same court, while paragraph 21 concerns the FCC and its constitutional position. The two should not be conflated.

Childcare, relocation and COVID-19 required a real assessment

Paragraph 25 says the circumstances relied upon had to be considered in their proper social context. Marriage, relocation, childbirth and childcare may materially affect the continuity of a woman's research. Their cumulative effect should not be dismissed merely by describing them as personal choices. Judgment, paragraphs 25.

The direction is nevertheless grounded in the record. The competent authority must sympathetically examine the nature, duration and actual effect of those circumstances, together with any university delay, and determine how far they contributed to the missed timeline. None produces an automatic extension on its own or in combination. Judgment, paragraphs 25.

Paragraph 28 develops the constitutional dimension through Articles 25 and 34. It explains that equality need not always mean identical treatment and that reasonable accommodation, within the available legal or policy flexibility, may remove disadvantages affecting women's educational advancement. The Court also considered the absence of harm to accrued or competing third-party rights relevant to that approach. Judgment, paragraphs 28.

The ruling supports meaningful consideration within the governing framework. It does not create an unlimited exception from all academic requirements because a scholar is married or has children.

The authorities and what the FCC used them for

The judgment traces the law across several decades. The following are the principal authorities discussed; their roles are stated from the FCC judgment rather than presented as independent reviews of every earlier decision.

• University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed, PLD 1965 SC 90: fairness remains necessary when educational institutions exercise their powers; autonomy does not eliminate lawful supervision. Discussed in paragraph 14.
• Hafsa Habib Qureshi and others v. Amir Hamza and others, PLD 2024 SC 780: restraint in educational matters is not an absolute prohibition on intervention where authorities exceed their powers or violate governing law. Discussed in paragraphs 16–17.
• Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan, PLD 2022 SC 92: authority relied upon by the High Court on academic restraint, which the FCC held required a proper inquiry into the nature of this decision. Discussed in paragraph 11.
• Munibah Qureshi v. NUST, 2026 MLD 1086: a comparable PhD-extension dispute in which the High Court required consideration under the HEC framework while leaving the extension decision to the university. Discussed in paragraph 10.
• International Islamic University v. Dr. Shameem Tariq, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1336: the Full Bench authority concerning IIUI's statutory structure and the character of instruments made under its Ordinance. Discussed in paragraphs 19–23.
• Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari, PLD 1966 SC 854; Ardeshir Cowasjee v. Karachi Building Control Authority, 1999 SCMR 2883; Ameer Zeb v. State, PLD 2012 SC 380; and Mst. Samrana Nawaz v. M.C.B. Bank Ltd., PLD 2021 SC 581: cited on judicial discipline and the proper course for reconsidering an earlier legal principle. Discussed in paragraphs 20–21.

Paragraph 15 lists further decisions illustrating continuity in the academic-autonomy jurisprudence from 1981 onward. The complete judgment provides their citations and context without requiring readers to infer a separate holding from each name.

What IIUI must now do

The Court required fresh consideration of the extension request based on the relevant record and clause 3.12(iv). Shehla Khaliq must receive a reasonable opportunity of hearing and may submit material relevant to the grounds she already raised. The authority must decide independently through a reasoned order under the applicable law and policy, preferably within thirty days of receipt of a certified copy. The decision must be communicated to the FCC through the Registrar. Judgment, paragraphs 29.

Leave to appeal was granted, the petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the High Court judgment and IIUI's regret letter were set aside. The writ petition stood disposed of in those terms. There was no order as to costs. Judgment, paragraphs 30.

The thirty-day period is expressed as a preference and runs from receipt of the certified copy. It should not be reported as an absolute deadline measured from publication of this article.

Practical documents for an extension request or challenge

The following are practical implications of the issues discussed, rather than a new mandatory checklist imposed by the FCC:

• Enrolment date, applicable degree-duration rules and any cohort relaxation.
• Coursework, examination, result and synopsis-processing dates, with relevant correspondence.
• Evidence of circumstances beyond the scholar's control, their duration and their actual effect on research.
• Material identifying delay attributable to the institution itself.
• The completed thesis and accompanying reports or supervisor confirmation, where completion is asserted.
• The representation, the refusal, the authority that considered it and the reasons recorded.
• The applicable HEC clause and the statutory source of university rules relied upon.

A strong request should connect the evidence to the policy criteria. A strong decision should show that the authority considered those criteria, rather than merely repeat that the ordinary period expired.

Frequently asked questions

Did the FCC grant an extension or approve the PhD thesis?

No. It ordered IIUI to reconsider the request through a hearing and a reasoned decision. Academic evaluation remains with the university. Judgment, paragraphs 26 and 29–30.

Does the HEC mechanism cover scholars enrolled before 2023?

Yes. The Court relied on the footnote to clause 3.12 to apply the procedure to earlier-enrolled scholars, including this petitioner. Judgment, paragraphs 7–8.

Can university autonomy exclude all judicial review?

No. Review of legality and procedure is distinct from judicial substitution of specialist academic judgment. Judgment, paragraphs 12 and 17.

Do childcare or COVID-19 automatically justify extra time?

No. Their nature, duration and actual effects, individually and cumulatively, must be assessed under the applicable policy. Judgment, paragraphs 24–25.

Sources and a date discrepancy in the judgment

The primary source is the complete twenty-four-page FCC judgment supplied for publication. It records F.C.P.L.A. No. 59 of 2025, a hearing and judgment date of 1 October 2026, the two judges named above and approval for reporting. No reporter citation is printed in the supplied judgment.

The header and paragraph 1 identify the challenged Islamabad High Court judgment as dated 4 August 2025 in W.P. No. 1594 of 2025. Paragraph 30 instead refers to 26 May 2025, and paragraph 1 contains a mixed petition-year reference. Those inconsistencies are present in both the supplied copy and the official FCC PDF. The article uses the header's case identification and does not invent a correction to the underlying High Court record. The FCC case number and substantive directions remain clear.

• Read the complete attached judgment.
• Download the attached judgment PDF.
• Official FCC judgment PDF.
• Federal Constitutional Court official portal.
• Searchable judgment summary and full case metadata.

All substantive analysis is based on the supplied judgment. Its discussion of the HEC policy and earlier cases is attributed to the Court. The post-remand university decision has not been verified. For connected material, visit our constitutional-law articles and judgment library.