Section 295-C and Digital Evidence: Qaiser Ayub’s Death Sentence Upheld, Amoon Acquitted

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

Different evidence produced different outcomes

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has upheld Qaiser Ayub’s conviction and death sentence under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code while acquitting his brother, Amoon Ayub. The judgment turns on the evidence connecting each accused to the online material. The Court accepted a combination of forensic files, account records, domain ownership and personal documents against Qaiser. It found that the evidence against Amoon did not establish the required personal involvement and knowledge.

The supplied digitally certified copy records that the judgment was announced on 7 October 2026. The case was heard on 6 July 2026 by Chief Justice Yahya Afridi, Justice Shakeel Ahmad and Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim. Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim authored the judgment. The copy is marked “Not Approved for Reporting” and contains no law-report citation.

The distinction between the brothers is the central legal point. Registration of a shared internet connection or an office tenancy in a person’s name does not, by itself, prove that the person created or uploaded unlawful content. The Court required an assessment of the individual evidence rather than treating the family relationship as sufficient proof of joint responsibility: paragraphs 10–11.

The complaint and the earlier decisions

According to the prosecution account reproduced in the judgment, the complainant discovered the disputed online material in August 2010 and approached police with a written application and printed pages. The material appeared on a public blog associated with an organisation’s main website. The pages displayed names and contact details attributed to the petitioners.

The matter moved between the local police and the FIA Cyber Crime Wing before FIR No. 105 was registered on 9 June 2011 at Police Station City Talagang under section 295-C PPC. The Court describes the delay as arising from uncertainty over responsibility for investigating an internet-based offence and the preliminary technical inquiry.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Talagang, convicted both brothers on 13 December 2018. Each received a death sentence and a fine of Rs. 100,000, with six months’ simple imprisonment in default of payment. The Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, upheld the convictions on 8 June 2022 in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1030 and 1031 of 2018 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 7-T of 2018.

The Supreme Court dealt with Amoon’s Jail Petition No. 326 of 2022 and Qaiser’s Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1165 of 2022. Their procedural outcomes were different: Amoon’s petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; Qaiser’s petition was dismissed and leave refused. Those distinctions appear in paragraph 11.

What the Court said about section 295-C and intent

Paragraph 5 discusses the breadth of section 295-C. The judgment explains that the provision extends to spoken or written words, visible representations and direct or indirect forms of expression. Its analysis includes online publication within that discussion.

The paragraph also refers to both the underlying act and the required intent. That matters to the later treatment of Amoon: the possibility that he possessed a shared device without actual knowledge of the material could not be excluded. The judgment therefore did not treat the presence of a device or a name on a utility account as a complete answer to the question of culpability.

The actual sentence upheld against Qaiser was death. This article addresses the evidentiary reasoning and the operative order in this case; it does not derive a general sentencing choice from the statutory wording reproduced in the copy.

Why the Court accepted the digital evidence against Qaiser

The judgment records the recovery of computer equipment on Qaiser’s identification of his office in November 2014. Of particular importance were an Acer CPU and a Lenovo laptop examined by the FIA Cyber Crime Wing. The Court relied on the forensic report and the evidence of the examining officer: paragraphs 2–3 and 7–8.

The reasoning involved several connections. The recovered devices contained files corresponding to material published on the blog. Account information and access records connected the online activity to email accounts attributed to Qaiser. Domain registration records showed that he had purchased the organisation’s main domain in June 2009. The Court regarded the blog as an associated publishing outlet connected with those records and credentials.

The defence argued that the WordPress page was an independent third-party site created without Qaiser’s authorisation. The Court rejected that explanation on its assessment of the displayed administrative details, the domain registration material and the forensic account evidence. This was a finding about the particular records before it, not a technical rule that every blog sharing an organisation’s name must belong to the owner of another domain: paragraph 7.

Personal documents were used to answer the planting allegation

Qaiser also disputed the recovered devices and alleged that the incriminating material had been planted. The Court considered the other information extracted from the same hardware when assessing that defence.

The laptop contained extensive personal records attributed to him, including travel documents, visa-related material, financial records and private correspondence. The Court treated their presence alongside the disputed files as strong evidence that the devices belonged to him and were under his control. It found the planting explanation unconvincing: paragraph 8.

Paragraph 9 adds that correspondence recovered from personal email accounts supported the Court’s finding of conscious involvement and intent. The judgment’s conclusion against Qaiser thus rested on the combined force of the device contents, personal data, registration records, account evidence and correspondence.

For legal analysis, those separate links should be kept visible. A file found on a computer, ownership of a device, operation of an account and responsibility for publication are distinct propositions. The Court found that the evidence connected them in Qaiser’s case. Its treatment of Amoon shows why that conclusion cannot simply be transferred to another accused who shared premises, facilities or family connections.

Why Amoon’s internet connection and tenancy were insufficient

The Court identified three main strands of the prosecution case against Amoon: the landline connection registered in his name, the office tenancy in his name and the recovery of a Dell laptop from his father-in-law’s residence.

It rejected the view that the first two matters alone conclusively established that he personally created or uploaded the material. Paragraph 10 recognises that, within a family or joint business, a utility connection or lease may be registered in one person’s name while being used by others.

The legal significance is individual attribution. Being the subscriber may identify the connection through which activity occurred, but it does not necessarily identify the person who performed that activity. Likewise, being the tenant of an office does not automatically establish responsibility for every file on equipment located there.

The Court expressly refused to impose responsibility for another family member’s acts simply because a shared facility was registered in Amoon’s name. The family relationship and administrative records did not supply the missing proof of his own involvement.

Doubts about the laptop recovery and knowledge

The third strand required separate scrutiny. The prosecution relied on recovery of a Dell laptop from the residence of Amoon’s father-in-law. Paragraph 10 refers to a prosecution witness’s cross-examination about the physical state of that laptop. The Court considered the testimony to create uncertainty over its condition and whether the internal drive was intact or had been altered while in custody.

The wording in the copy is unusual, so the point should be stated with care: the Court found an ambiguity that weakened the recovery. It did not make a definitive finding that police had altered the drive.

The Court then considered the evidence even on the assumption that the recovery was accepted. Brothers may share or borrow electronic devices. It found that the possibility of Amoon having his brother’s laptop without knowing about the disputed contents could not be ruled out. No additional evidence established the required connection between his conduct and the offence attributed to Qaiser.

Those findings produced the benefit of doubt. They do not create immunity for a subscriber, tenant or person holding a shared laptop. They explain why those circumstances were insufficient in this record without dependable evidence of personal participation and knowledge.

Why the delay in registering the FIR did not defeat the prosecution

The interval between discovery of the material and registration of the FIR was approximately ten months. The Supreme Court accepted the explanation that the complainant had acted promptly, but the matter was passed between police and the FIA while technical and jurisdictional questions were addressed: paragraph 6.

The Court therefore distinguished delayed formal registration from delayed initial reporting. It found no basis, in the account it accepted, to attribute the elapsed time to deliberation or fabrication by the complainant.

That is a fact-specific conclusion. When citing it, the important question is what the record shows about the initial complaint and the reasons for the later FIR. The decision should not be reduced to a proposition that lengthy delay in a digital-content case is always immaterial.

The practical significance for digital criminal evidence

The judgment illustrates why the evidence against each accused must be assessed separately. Against Qaiser, the Court accepted a combination of technical records and personal information as proving control, involvement and intent. Against Amoon, shared administrative connections and a disputed device recovery left unresolved doubt.

The decision also makes the distinction between access to a facility and responsibility for an act particularly clear. The name on an internet account may be relevant evidence; its weight depends on the other material connecting the accused to the activity. The same reasoning applies to the office tenancy and the possibility of shared hardware considered by the Court.

For practitioners reviewing such a record, the questions emerging from this judgment are concrete: what connects the accused to the relevant account; what connects the recovered files to publication; what shows control of the hardware; what establishes knowledge; and what uncertainties arise from the recovery and custody evidence? These are analytical questions drawn from the judgment, rather than a claim that the Court prescribed a universal forensic checklist.

The Court’s device-attribution reasoning is forceful, but the supplied opinion does not give a detailed discussion of every possible technical safeguard, such as forensic hash comparison or a full account of each transfer in the custody chain. An article cannot fill those gaps by claiming that unmentioned procedures were performed or that this judgment dispenses with them.

The final order and the limits of the ruling

In paragraph 11, the Court upheld Qaiser’s conviction and sentences under section 295-C PPC and refused leave in Criminal Petition No. 1165 of 2022. It allowed Amoon’s appeal arising from Jail Petition No. 326 of 2022, set aside his conviction and sentences, and ordered his release unless detention was required in another case.

The ruling supports a focused proposition: digital material must be connected to the individual accused through the evidence, and family membership or registration of shared facilities cannot alone establish responsibility. The acquittal of one brother and the maintained conviction of the other reflect the Court’s differing assessments of that evidence.

For a related discussion of prosecution proof and attempts to place an explanatory burden on an accused, see the Salman judgment analysis. That decision concerns a different factual setting and should be read on its own terms.

Source: the complete nine-page digitally certified judgment copy supplied for this article. Paragraphs 5–10 contain the statutory and evidentiary discussion; paragraph 11 contains the operative order. The announcement date is handwritten on the final page.