Section 295-C: Supreme Court Acquits Brothers over Doubt About Mental Capacity

Independently written and published by Shahbaz Shah Legal Journal.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted Umar Draz and Liaqat Ali in a section 295-C PPC case after the psychiatric evidence raised doubt about their criminal responsibility. It set aside the death sentences and convictions, directed their release if not required in another case, and expected their necessary medical treatment to continue. Main judgment, paragraphs 11–12, continuing on page 7.

The judgment was announced on 7 October 2026. Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim wrote the main opinion for a bench comprising Chief Justice Yahya Afridi, Justice Shakeel Ahmad and himself. Justice Shakeel Ahmad agreed with acquittal but added a separate note explaining that a psychiatric diagnosis alone does not establish the statutory defence under section 84 PPC. Bench and case particulars Announcement date Concurring note, paragraphs 1–2.

The appeal focused on mental capacity

The brothers were convicted by the Sessions Court at Jhang on 27 March 2009 in FIR No. 166/2006, Police Station Sadar Jhang. The Lahore High Court upheld their convictions on 17 September 2015. Their jail petition was converted into an appeal on 6 February 2020. Before the Supreme Court, counsel confined the submissions to mental unsoundness rather than arguing the merits of the underlying allegations. Main judgment, paragraphs 1–3.

The decisive question concerned their capacity at the time of the alleged acts. It was not enough simply to ask whether either man had a recognised psychiatric diagnosis by the time the appeal was heard. The connection between the illness, its effects and the relevant time is central to the separate note as well as to a careful reading of the result. Main judgment, paragraph 3 Concurring note, paragraphs 2–4.

Why the medical record was revisited

A three-member medical board at DHQ Hospital, Faisalabad, had reported in March 2007 that both men were mentally sound. In February 2023, the Supreme Court considered the earlier findings inadequate for the legal inquiry and ordered fresh examination. Further proceedings led to an eight-member specialist board whose August 2023 report diagnosed bipolar affective disorder with psychotic symptoms. Main judgment, paragraphs 5–7.

After further directions in May 2025, a nine-member board examined the brothers and reported in September 2025 that they had bipolar affective disorder, current episode manic. Three members of the board also appeared before the Court on 6 July 2026 to explain the condition and its effects during an acute episode. Main judgment, paragraphs 8–9.

The main opinion gave substantial weight to the later specialist evaluations and accepted the diagnoses. Reading that material with the circumstances discussed in the judgment, Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim found doubt about culpability which could not be withheld from the appellants. The Court recorded that they had spent around twenty years in custody. These are findings in this criminal appeal, rather than a general medical conclusion about everyone who has bipolar disorder. Main judgment, paragraphs 10–11.

The concurring note distinguishes diagnosis from the Section 84 test

Justice Shakeel Ahmad's note agrees with the acquittal while making the statutory inquiry more precise. Section 84 concerns a person who, by reason of unsoundness of mind at the time of the act, could not know its nature or that it was wrong or contrary to law. Medical illness and the legal incapacity specified in that provision are distinct questions. Concurring note, paragraphs 1–2.

The note addresses medical language stating that the possibility of illness at the relevant time could not be ruled out. That is not, by itself, a categorical finding that the accused was then in an episode severe enough to satisfy section 84. A bare possibility cannot ordinarily carry the defence on its own. Concurring note, paragraphs 3–4.

The evidence need not establish the past mental state with mathematical certainty, however. The accused's burden in bringing the case within section 84 is not as onerous as the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Medical opinions and surrounding circumstances must be considered together; where the whole record raises reasonable doubt about the relevant capacity, that doubt may benefit the accused. Concurring note, paragraphs 4–6.

Evidence must connect the condition to the occurrence

The separate note identifies the kind of evidence that may assist: psychiatric history, treatment or hospitalisation around the relevant period, testimony from relatives and treating professionals, disabling symptoms, and conduct before, during and after the occurrence. Planning, concealment, flight, rational statements or other conduct showing awareness may also bear on the inquiry. No single circumstance is necessarily conclusive. Concurring note, paragraph 5.

Even later repentance does not by itself prove or disprove the accused's capacity at the earlier time. The court must examine the evidence cumulatively and connect it to the statutory test. The note therefore guards against two shortcuts: treating a diagnosis as an automatic defence, or demanding an absolute retrospective medical finding before considering reasonable doubt. Concurring note, paragraphs 5–6.

Acquittal was the relief, with continuing treatment

This was an acquittal, rather than commutation to life imprisonment or a temporary suspension of execution. The trial and High Court judgments were set aside. Release was ordered subject to the usual condition concerning detention in another case; the judgment itself does not establish the date on which either man actually left custody. Main judgment, paragraph 12, continuing on page 7.

The Court expected the Executive Director of PIMH, Lahore, to ensure that requisite treatment was not discontinued. The concurring note also discusses legal capacity in Islamic jurisprudence and explains that humane application of the law must remain grounded in legal responsibility and evidence. It does not substitute sympathy for the requirements of section 84. Main judgment, paragraph 12 Concurring note, paragraphs 7–13.

For criminal appeals, the practical lesson is to assemble a coherent record linking the condition to the legally relevant time and to distinguish the medical opinion from the legal conclusion the court must reach. Both opinions should be read together when relying on this decision. Concurring note, paragraphs 2–6.

Related reading: a separate section 295-C appeal concerning digital evidence and individual responsibility. Its facts and evidentiary issues differ from the mental-capacity inquiry decided here.

Sources

• Read the complete Supreme Court judgment.
• Download judgment PDF.
• Case metadata and searchable judgment summary.

Frequently asked questions

Were Umar Draz and Liaqat Ali acquitted or only given reduced sentences?

They were acquitted. The Supreme Court set aside the trial and High Court judgments and directed release if they were not required in another case. main judgment, paragraph 12, continuing on page 7.

Does a diagnosis of bipolar disorder by itself establish the Section 84 defence?

No. Justice Shakeel Ahmad's concurring note expressly distinguishes a psychiatric diagnosis from the legal test: the accused's capacity to understand the nature or wrongfulness of the act at the time of its commission. concurring note, paragraphs 2–4.

Can uncertainty in medical evidence still benefit an accused?

The concurring note requires the evidence to be assessed as a whole. A bare possibility is ordinarily insufficient by itself, but medical opinions and surrounding evidence may together raise a reasonable doubt about the legally relevant mental capacity at the time of the act. concurring note, paragraphs 4–6.

What medical evidence did the main judgment accept?

It accepted the later specialist boards' assessments diagnosing bipolar affective disorder and considered the experts' explanation of the condition. The Court held that the medical material raised doubt about the brothers' culpability in this case. main judgment, paragraphs 7–11.

Did the Court order their treatment to stop after acquittal?

No. It expected the Executive Director of the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore, to ensure that the requisite medical treatment was not discontinued. main judgment, paragraph 12.

Does the downloadable PDF include the separate concurring note?

Yes. The complete fifteen-page PDF includes the main judgment by Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim and the eight-page concurring note by Justice Shakeel Ahmad. opening of the concurring note.